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 A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING REASONABLE 
ROYALTIES IN PATENT LITIGATION 
Norman V. Siebrasse* 
Thomas F. Cotter** 
Abstract 
Over the past decade, eight-, nine- and even ten-figure damages 
awards have become a recurring feature in patent infringement litigation, 
and yet the principal methods for calculating reasonable royalties (the 
most common form of damages in patent cases) remain unsatisfying and 
incoherent. Most frequently, courts employ what we refer to as a “pure 
ex ante” approach, which aims to construct the hypothetical bargain the 
parties themselves would have struck prior to infringement (ex ante), 
based on whatever information would have been available to them at that 
time. This approach has the advantage of avoiding patent “holdup”—
basing the royalty partly on the infringer’s sunk costs—but cannot easily 
explain other longstanding features of how royalties are calculated, and 
can result in awards that reflect the parties’ erroneous ex ante 
expectations. Alternatively, some commentators have proposed a “pure 
ex post” approach, which aspires to recreate the bargain the parties might 
have reached as of some later date, such as the date of judgment. This 
approach uses more accurate information about the technology’s actual 
value, but contrary to sound innovation policy it also would enable the 
patentee to capture some of the patent’s holdup value. In this Article, we 
show that a “contingent ex ante” framework, under which the court 
attempts to construct the ex ante bargain the parties would have struck 
on the basis of all relevant information that is available ex post, is 
superior to both of the above approaches. More specifically, our 
framework enables courts to base the royalty on the most accurate 
information available while avoiding the holdup risk arising from the 
pure ex post approach. We analyze how courts can apply this approach 
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in various settings, including cases involving FRAND-committed 
standard essential patents, sequential infringement, regulatory 
uncertainty, and unexpected exogenous events. 
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An imaginary bid by an imaginary buyer, acting upon the 
information available at the moment of the breach, is not the 
limit of recovery where the subject of the bargain is an 
undeveloped patent. Information at such a time might be so 
scanty and imperfect that the offer would be nominal. The 
promisee of the patent has less than fair compensation if the 
criterion of value is the price that he would have received if 
he had disposed of it at once, irrespective of the value that 
would have been uncovered if he had kept it as his own. 
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 
699 (1933). 
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“The real value—the actual value—of what has been taken is always 
the ultimate question.” 
 
United States Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 616 (6th Cir. 
1917).  
INTRODUCTION 
Following a jury trial in 2012, a federal district court entered judgment 
in the amount of $1 billion in favor of Monsanto in a patent infringement 
dispute against DuPont.1 The $1 billion damages award reflected the 
jury’s best estimate of the lump-sum amount that DuPont would have 
agreed to pay and that Monsanto would have accepted, just before the 
infringement began, in the counterfactual world in which DuPont had 
negotiated for a license rather than infringed.2 The jarring feature of this 
case is not so much the amount of the damages—billion dollar awards, 
though hardly an everyday occurrence, are not unheard of in U.S. patent 
litigation 3 —but rather that, while DuPont made some quantities of 
infringing seed, it never sold any of this seed and therefore enjoyed no 
sales revenue, much less profit, as a result of the infringement.4 The 
damages award was based entirely on a hypothetical bargain that the 
parties would have struck ex ante (before infringement), based on 
DuPont’s expected (but, as it turned out, unconsummated) sales volume.5 
While this result may seem odd at first blush, it is consistent with one 
of the standard approaches for calculating reasonable royalties in patent 
infringement litigation.6 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
                                                                                                                     
 1. The case was Monsanto Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. 4:09-CV-00686-
ERW, 2012 WL 2979080 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2012). There is no reported opinion following the 
entry of judgment, and the case settled shortly thereafter. For a discussion of the case, see Bernard 
Chao & Jonathan R. Gray, A $1 Billion Parable, 90 DENVER U. L. REV. ONLINE 185 (2013). 
 2. See Chao & Gray, supra note 1, at 185–86. 
 3. See OWEN BYRD ET AL., LEX MACHINA: PATENT LITIGATION DAMAGES REPORT 10 
(2014) (noting three such cases, including Monsanto, as well as several others with awards in 
excess of $100 million). 
 4. See Chao & Gray, supra note 1, at 185–88. According to Professor Bernard Chao and 
Jonathan Gray, DuPont had a license with Monsanto but engaged in experimentation on 
Monsanto’s patented technology in an effort to develop an improved product. Id. at 186. DuPont 
thereafter abandoned the project. Id. at 188. However, under the terms of its settlement with 
Monsanto, DuPont may continue to develop improvements on genetically modified seeds. See 
Casey Gilliam, Monsanto, DuPont Strike $1.75 Billion Licensing Deal, End Lawsuits, REUTERS 
(Mar. 26, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-monsanto-dupont-gmo-idUSBRE92 
P0IK20130326. 
 5. See Chao & Gray, supra note 1, at 186–87. 
 6. See id. at 186–88 (arguing, however, that the award might have been flawed absent 
evidence that DuPont would have agreed to a lump-sum royalty in such a large amount, as 
opposed to a running royalty based on actual sales). In U.S. law, compensatory damages for patent 
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Circuit observed in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,7 “the 
hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ 
approach[] attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would 
have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before 
infringement began,” recreating “as best as possible . . . the ex ante 
licensing negotiation scenario and . . . resulting agreement.” 8  Most 
economists and patent scholars who have expressed a view on the matter 
support the ex ante perspective for two reasons. First, it (ideally) restores 
the status quo but for the infringement and thus preserves the patent 
incentive. 9  Second, it reduces the social costs of patent “holdup,” 
meaning in this context the patent owner’s ability to extract a royalty that 
reflects not just the value of the patented technology but also a portion of 
                                                                                                                     
infringement usually take one of two forms: lost profits or reasonable royalties. 35 U.S.C. § 284 
(2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made 
of the invention by the infringer . . . .”). Lost profits are appropriate where the infringement 
deprived the patent owner of sales—or, to put it another way, where but for the infringement the 
patent owner would have excluded the infringer (rather than agreeing to license the infringer’s 
use in exchange for a royalty). Reasonable royalties are appropriate where the patent owner would 
have agreed to a license ex ante, or where the patent owner cannot prove the amount of its lost 
profits. For discussion, see ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 58–59, 242–43 (2005).  
 7. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 8. Id. at 1324–25 (quoting Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). As the court notes, the willing licensor–willing licensee framework 
is the “more common approach” for calculating royalties under U.S. law, but courts sometimes 
have permitted use of a less common method known as the “analytical” approach, which “focuses 
on the infringer’s projections of profit for the infringing product.” Id. at 1324; see, e.g., TWM 
Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (approving special master’s use of 
the analytical approach involving subtraction of “the infringer’s usual or acceptable net profit 
from its anticipated net profit realized from sales of infringing devices”); Linear Grp. Servs., LLC 
v. Attica Automation, Inc., No. 13-10108, 2014 WL 4206871, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2014) 
(granting motion to exclude evidence that would be irrelevant to the patentee’s use at trial of the 
analytical method). But see Martha K. Gooding, Analyzing the “Analytic Method” of Calculating 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, BLOOMBERG BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 
DAILY (May 11, 2012) (arguing that governing precedent does not authorize use of the analytical 
method to the exclusion of the willing licensor–willing licensee framework). As discussed herein, 
our proposed framework for calculating reasonable royalties generally requires the use of ex post 
information and therefore would eliminate the analytical approach. 
 9. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 138 (2011) (“For remedies to protect the patent 
system’s incentives to innovate and avoid distorting competition among technologies, they must 
replicate the reward the patentee would have earned in the market absent infringement.”); Ted 
Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of ‘Private Law’ Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 540–41 (2014) 
(referring to the “standard model of patent remedies” as one in which, to preserve the patent 
incentive, “patent damages should return the patentee to the hypothetical state of affairs that would 
have obtained but for the infringement”).  
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the infringer’s sunk costs of implementing the infringing technology.10 
Because these sunk costs are not related to the value of the patented 
technology, awarding a royalty that is based in part on the value the 
defendant would derive from avoiding these costs distorts the patent 
incentive by overrewarding the patentee, thus raising both the private and 
social costs of implementing patented technology without any 
corresponding public benefit.11 
We generally agree with the mainstream view described above—that 
courts should calculate patent royalties based on an ex ante bargaining 
framework—and have so argued in other work.12 We also agree that the 
reason for using the ex ante framework is to preserve the patent incentive 
and avoid holdup. But just because an ex ante timing for the hypothetical 
negotiation is necessary to prevent holdup, it does not follow that only ex 
ante information should be used. 13  The traditional approach to the 
hypothetical negotiation implicitly assumes that, because a hypothetical 
negotiation is assumed to take place ex ante, it can be based only on ex 
ante information—that is, on the expected value of the invention.14 We 
argue, however, that this coupling of ex ante timing and ex ante 
information is neither necessary nor desirable, and that instead the 
reasonable royalty should reflect an ex ante negotiation, based on ex post 
information. The ex ante timing of the hypothetical negotiation is aimed 
at ensuring that only the value of the invention is captured—that is, that 
the negotiation does not enable the patentee to hold up the user for sunk 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 144 (referring to the “higher royalty based 
on switching costs” as the “ʻhold-up’ value of the patent”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY FRAND COMMITMENTS 4 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/atr/legacy/2014/09/18/290994.pdf (discussing the problems associated with patent holdups). 
 11. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 190 (stating that a “damages award that is based 
on high switching costs, rather than the ex ante value of the patented technology compared to 
alternatives, overcompensates the patentee” because “[i]t improperly reflects the economic value of 
investments by the infringer rather just than the economic value of the invention”). 
 12. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Remedies and Practical Reason, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 125, 130 (2010); Norman V. Siebrasse et al., Damages Calculations in Intellectual Property 
Cases in Canada, 24 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 153, 155, 168 (2009). 
 13. By the same token, a case that invokes an ex ante hypothetical negotiation to address the 
holdup problem is not good authority for the proposition that the parties should be assumed to have 
only ex ante information. In particular, in Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 
1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the court explicitly justified the holding that the hypothetical negotiation 
takes place before the infringement began as a means of avoiding the holdup problem, and one 
cannot take the holding to imply that courts should use only ex ante information.   
 14. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 166 (stating that courts assume “that the 
hypothetical negotiation takes place at the time the infringement began,” and that “[t]his timing 
determines the information available to the parties during the negotiation” (citing Riles, 298 F.3d at 
1313)). 
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costs unrelated to the value of the invention. Conversely, the reasonable 
royalty should ensure that the patentee is not underrewarded, in order to 
preserve the patent incentive. But the overarching principle is that 
damages should reflect the true value of the invention, and ex post 
information provides a better measure of the true value of the invention.15 
Our thinking on this issue first arose in the context of standard-setting 
organizations (SSOs), which often require or permit participating 
members to declare which, if any, of their patents are essential to the 
practice of any standards the SSO promulgates and to commit to licensing 
those patents on “fair,” “reasonable,” and “non-discriminatory” 
(FRAND) terms. 16  Because SSOs typically do not define the term 
“FRAND,” however, courts may be called upon to determine what an 
appropriate FRAND royalty is when the owner of a FRAND-encumbered 
SEP files suit for infringement.17 As one might imagine, the debate over 
whether FRAND royalties, like reasonable royalties more generally, 
should be calculated on an ex ante or an ex post basis has been 
particularly intense given the size of the relevant markets and the amounts 
of licensing revenue at stake. 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 
GA. L. REV. 79, 117–18 (2014) (arguing that the fundamental goal of patent remedies should be 
to accurately value the patented technology because doing so serves the public policy purpose of 
providing optimal incentives to invent). We agree with Professor Taylor’s thesis but develop the 
point differently. Professor Taylor focuses primarily on the distinction between the value of patent 
rights and the value of the patented technology, emphasizing that the value of patent rights turns 
on uncertainty regarding liability, relief, and enforceability, as well as negotiation and litigation 
costs, which are all irrelevant to the value of the underlying technology. See id. at 118–26. In 
contrast, we focus on the contrast between ex post and ex ante information, a point that Professor 
Taylor expressly leaves open. See id. at 136–37. 
 16. See, e.g., EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY 
§ 6.1 (2015), http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf; INST. OF ELEC. 
AND ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS ¶ 6.2(b) (Dec. 2015), 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf; INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, 
COMMON PATENT POLICY FOR ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC § 2.1, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); see also RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW 
UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF 
STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 48–99 (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/PGA_058712 (discussing the disclosure and 
licensing obligations among twelve leading SSOs). 
 17. See Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., 809 F.3d 1295, 1304–
05 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter CSIRO]; Ericsson, Inc. v. D–Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1235 
(Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 
5593609, at *6–8 (Oct. 3, 2013); cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1036–38 
(9th Cir. 2015), aff’g No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) 
(involving a breach of contract action brought by would-be licensee). 
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Proceeding from an idea originally proposed by Mario Mariniello,18 
we will argue that neither a “pure” ex ante nor a pure ex post methodology 
for calculating FRAND royalties, or reasonable royalties more generally, 
is ideal. To be sure, a pure ex ante approach—one that attempts to 
construct the bargain the parties would have reached ex ante, based only 
on the information set that was available to them ex ante—is preferable 
to a pure ex post approach, which as noted above enables some degree of 
patent holdup. But the pure ex ante approach misses something too, 
namely the (non-holdup) value conferred upon an individual SEP by 
virtue of its incorporation into the SSO’s chosen standard. Some portion 
of an SEP’s value, in other words, is attributable to the fact that the SEP 
is complementary to other SEPs that read on the chosen standard, and that 
its inclusion within the standard ensures widespread use. By contrast, if 
a patent that is potentially an SEP ex ante winds up not being included in 
the standard, its market value ex post might fall to zero. Given these 
effects of standardization, we will argue that the ideal framework does 
not entail constructing the ex ante bargain the parties would have reached 
based on ex ante information (in this context, based on the probability 
that the patent would be included within the standard). Rather, it is the ex 
ante bargain they would have negotiated contingent on the patent under 
consideration being included in the chosen standard—or, to put it 
another way, the ex ante bargain the parties would have negotiated if they 
had been in possession of the information set that is available ex post (at 
the time of trial), namely that the patent did wind up being included in 
the standard.19 More specifically, we will show that, in the standard-
                                                                                                                     
 18. See Mario Mariniello, Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A 
Challenge for Competition Authorities, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 523, 526 (2011) (stating that 
“the licensing terms offered after the adoption of the standard (ex-post) should not be worse than 
those which the patent holder would have committed to ex-ante in the context of a standard setting 
contest conditional on the information that is available ex-post”). 
 19. We have further developed the application of our approach to SEPs in a companion 
paper, Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016). As discussed in that paper, the Federal Circuit’s two most recent decisions 
on FRAND royalties, CSIRO and Ericsson, purport to forbid courts from taking into consideration 
“any value added by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology.”  Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 
1232; CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1304 (citing Ericsson with approval). We argue, however, that from an 
economic perspective the principle that a FRAND royalty should not reflect “the value of the 
standard” is best understood as meaning that the royalty should not reflect holdup value and 
should be proportionate to the patent’s contribution to the standard. The primary concern should 
be to prevent what we refer to as “sunk costs hold-up,” and elaborating on the contingent ex ante 
approach developed here, we argue that the royalty should reflect the increased use of the 
technology resulting from the network effects attributable to the technology’s incorporation into 
a standard. Indeed, to the extent a FRAND royalty is calculated by multiplying a royalty rate by 
the value of an ex post royalty “base,” that ex post base necessarily will reflect, up to a point, 
those network effects. 
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setting context, our “contingent ex ante” approach—constructing the ex 
ante bargain the parties would have struck with the benefit of ex post 
information—is superior to the pure ex ante approach because it better 
serves a system of patent incentives, which ideally would award the 
patent owner in an amount that is commensurate with20 the social value 
of its invention.21 The contingent ex ante approach better achieves this 
goal both in the individual case, because it takes into account the fact that 
a patent incorporated into a standard is, all other things being equal, of 
greater social value than one that is not, and in the aggregate, due to 
selection bias in the population of cases that parties are likely to litigate. 
Our analysis doesn’t stop there, however. We will argue that the 
benefits of the contingent ex ante approach, in terms of aligning rewards 
with social value while also avoiding holdup, counsel in favor of adopting 
the approach, subject to administrability constraints, 22  in all other 
contexts in which courts are called upon to award reasonable royalties as 
well. Indeed, as we will show, courts already do apply a contingent ex 
ante approach (without referring to it as such) in relation to two common 
practices: first, by framing the standard willing licensor–willing licensee 
inquiry as an attempt to construct the ex ante bargain the parties would 
have reached on the assumption that both of them knew the patent claims 
at issue to be valid and infringed (a fact that actually can be known only 
ex post, namely at the entry of judgment);23 and second, by (frequently) 
awarding patent owners a “running” royalty equal to a hypothetical ex 
                                                                                                                     
 20. We say “commensurate with” rather than “equal to” because we are not arguing that 
patent owners should be able to extract the full social value of their inventions. For discussion, 
see, for example, Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 
257 (2007); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 529–39 
(2010); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1036 (2005); Taylor, supra note 15, at 138–39. 
 21. In this respect, we agree entirely with Professor Ted Sichelman that, ideally courts 
should align patent remedies with the need for an incentive to invent, or the lack thereof. See 
Sichelman, supra note 9, at 529–60. The remedial implications we derive from this premise, 
however, are quite different from his.  
 22. As discussed herein, although it is usually easier to use (real) ex post information than 
to use (hypothetical) ex ante information, this isn’t always the case, particularly where some 
portion of the patent’s value resides in its “insurance” function. See infra Section II.H. We also 
recognize that attempts to construct an ex ante bargain of any sort may suffer from information 
gaps, particularly in the context of SEPs. Nevertheless, even in such cases it is important to have 
a sense of what the theoretical ideal is so that one can look for proxies (such as comparable 
licenses) that are more likely to be consistent with, rather than contrary to, this ideal. 
 23. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
Relatedly, in litigation over the value of FRAND royalties, a court may take into account whether 
a patent that the owner declared essential really is essential (and therefore necessarily infringed 
by the defendant’s standard-compliant product) based on ex post evidence. See In re Innovatio IP 
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., Case No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 
2013).   
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ante rate multiplied by an ex post “base” consisting of the defendant’s 
actual sales revenue.24 Up to now, commentators have usually defended 
the former practice on the ground that the assumption of validity and 
infringement is necessary to avoid a double-discounting problem,25 while 
the latter might be defended on the ground that it is consistent with the 
manner in which many real-world licenses are structured.26 While we 
don’t disagree with these justifications, we will argue that our approach 
offers a deeper explanation that both unites the foregoing practices while 
also providing a principled framework for valuing SEPs and for 
determining reasonable royalties more generally. And while our approach 
might suggest that in some SEP cases courts should award higher 
royalties than they would under a pure ex ante approach, in other 
instances the use of ex post information can result in much lower awards. 
For example, in cases such as the Monsanto litigation described at the 
beginning of this Article, our approach would ensure that patent owners 
are not overrewarded merely because the defendant would have erred, 
during the ex ante state of the world, in estimating the actual value of the 
patent. By the same token, if the defendant underestimates the actual 
value of the patent, under the pure ex ante approach the patentee will be 
underrewarded.27 Similarly, as we will demonstrate, there are a variety of 
other real-world situations in which framing the hypothetical bargain as 
one in which the parties negotiated ex ante with the benefit of ex post 
information could either reduce or increase royalties based on the nature 
of the ex post events. These include cases, for example, in which the 
status of an alternative as noninfringing is revealed only ex post, or when 
regulatory approval for the marketing of a patented product is either 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming 
a 5% running royalty); Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338–39 (discussing running royalties). A third 
situation in which courts make use of ex post information involves the so-called “book of 
wisdom,” a term that comes from the Sinclair opinion cited at the beginning of this Article. On 
one (commonly held) view, the book of wisdom approach permits a court to use ex post 
information only to the extent it is probative in constructing the ex ante information to which the 
parties would have had access. See Aqua Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team, 774 F.3d 766, 772 
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Martha K. Gooding, Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages: A Proper Reading of 
the Book of Wisdom, BLOOMBERG BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Apr. 21, 
2014). In our view, however, the book of wisdom properly understood is entirely consistent 
with—indeed, foreshadows—our approach. See infra Subsection I.C.1. 
 25. See Stephen H. Kalos & Jonathan D. Putnam, On the Incomparability of ‘Comparable’: 
An Economic Interpretation of ‘Infringer’s Royalties,’ 9 NO. 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 1, 2 (1997). 
We explain what the “double discounting” problem is infra Subsection I.C.1. 
 26. See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent 
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 748 (2011) (suggesting that “the 
use of running royalties should reflect the types of royalty rates and bases that the parties 
realistically would have chosen ex ante”). 
 27. See infra Section II.D. 
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granted or denied ex post.28 Our analysis also provides a principled way 
of calculating damages in cases involving “sequential” infringement and 
thus avoids the formalistic distinctions that now govern such cases.29 
In short, the contingent ex ante framework offers a superior alternative 
to other options for calculating patent royalties by, on the one hand, 
offering a way to avoid holdup problems and excessive awards such as 
the one in Monsanto, while also taking into account the non-holdup value 
that standardization confers upon SEPs. It also provides a deeper 
rationale for the assumption of validity and infringement and for awards 
of running royalties, both of which aspects of current law depart from a 
pure ex ante approach; and it offers a more persuasive reading of Sinclair 
Oil—the case quoted at the beginning of this Article, in which Justice 
Cardozo coined the term “book of wisdom” to refer to the use of ex post 
information in damages calculations. 30  It is also consistent with the 
standard articulated by courts in Europe’s largest patent litigation system, 
Germany, which requires estimating what reasonable contracting parties 
would have agreed to, at the conclusion of a licensing agreement, if they 
had foreseen the future development and specifically the duration and 
amount of the use of the patent.”31 We have come to conclude that, on 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See infra Sections II.D, II.G. 
 29. See infra Section II.C. 
 30. According to some observers, courts have tended to invoke the “book of wisdom” 
asymmetrically to benefit patentees but not infringers. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 126 (citing 
Paul M. Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691, 726 (1992)). 
Sinclair Oil itself does not mandate this, and in our view it is completely unjustifiable to limit the 
use of ex post evidence in that way.  
 31. See BGH Mar. 14, 2000, GRUR 685 (688), 2000 (“Geschuldet ist das, was vernünftige 
Vertragspartner vereinbart hätten, wenn sie bei Abschluß eines Lizenzvertrages die künftige 
Entwicklung und namentlich die Zeitdauer und das Maß der patentbenutzung vorausgesehen 
hätten”) (citations omitted). For discussion of this principle under German law, see, for example, 
Markus Schönknecht, Determination of Patent Damages in Germany, 43 IIC 309, 322 (2012) 
(“Since the hypothetical parties are deemed to have foreseen the further course of events, this 
includes factual changes that occurred during the time of infringement (e.g., changes in the 
business situation that would have increased or decreased the royalties”)) (citing THOMAS 
KÜHNEN & EVA GESCHKE, DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON PATENTEN IN DER PRAXIS, No. 1402 (4th ed. 
2010)). See also THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 267–68 (2013) (suggesting that in practice German courts may give ex post evidence 
more weight when it favors the patentee). For discussion of a similar principle under Japanese 
law, see Masabumi Suzuki & Yoshiyuki Tamura, Japan, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF PATENTS 119, 
125 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2012) (asserting that Japanese courts calculate 
reasonable royalties “ex post, namely at the time of the infringement lawsuit and taking into 
account past circumstances, as opposed to ex ante, that is, at the time of concluding a license 
agreement and in the expectation of future circumstances”).  
Interestingly, in patent infringement actions litigated against the United States government 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims on occasion has articulated the standard 
for awarding a reasonable royalty in terms similar to what we propose above. See, e.g., Standard 
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the topic at issue, both Justice Cardozo and the German Federal Supreme 
Court have got things exactly right.  
That said, our argument is based primarily on policy and principle, 
and we do not review the existing case law in detail; this task has been 
sufficiently addressed by other authors, who show that while the case law 
is clear that the hypothetical negotiation is ex ante in the sense of timing, 
it is muddled on what we view as the separate question of whether ex post 
information should be used. 32 A good summary of the status quo is that 
“a hypothetical negotiation [takes place] at the time of first infringement 
using only facts available at that time, except for certain future facts that 
may be taken into account under the ‘book of wisdom’ principle,” but 
“there are few references to the book of wisdom in the case law, and of 
those, none provide clear guidance as to the nature and extent to which 
future facts and circumstances may be taken into account when assessing 
the appropriate reasonable royalty.”33 In light of the unsettled case law, 
it is, in our view, open to future courts to address the question of whether 
ex post information can be used as a matter of principle, which is the 
focus of this Article. 
Part I sets out in greater detail why a pure ex ante approach is better 
than a pure ex post approach and why the contingent ex ante approach is 
superior to both. Part II then discusses some refinements and specific 
applications of our analysis to a range of issues, including FRAND-
encumbered SEPs, sequential infringement, and the calculation of 
royalties in the face of exogenous technological or regulatory change.  
                                                                                                                     
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 762 (1999) (“Consideration of later-occurring events 
may be necessary to approximate a fair royalty to which negotiators with access to such 
knowledge would have agreed”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 15, 20 (1996) 
(citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 481 (1994), aff’d, 86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996); Penda Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 533, 573–74 (1993); and ITT Corp. v. United 
States, 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 202, 223 (1989), for the proposition that “the controlling precepts 
applicable . . . are that . . . if there is no established royalty, the rate will typically be determined 
through a process of hypothetical negotiation between a suppositious ‘willing buyer’ and ‘willing 
seller’ as of the date of initial infringement but using knowledge of events which occurred after 
the initial infringement and which, thus, could not have been known by actual negotiators as of 
that date”), vacated on other grounds, 226 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The ultimate source of the 
quoted material is a Federal Circuit decision, Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 
F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988), which today is often interpreted only as permitting evidence of 
ex post events as circumstantial evidence of ex ante expectations. See Gooding, supra note 24. 
 32. See, e.g., John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and 
Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 799–803 
(2013). 
 33. SEDONA CONFERENCE, COMMENTARY ON PATENT DAMAGES AND REMEDIES: A PROJECT 
OF THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON PATENT DAMAGES AND REMEDIES (WG9), 
PUBLIC COMMENT VERSION 15 (2014).  
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I.  THE CONTINGENT EX ANTE APPROACH 
Suppose that a patent owner successfully sues an infringer, and is 
awarded damages for the infringement. If the patentee and the defendant 
are competitors, and the patentee can quantify the sales and hence profit 
it lost as a result of the infringement, the court may award the amount of 
that lost profit.34 Alternatively, if there is an established royalty that the 
patentee normally charges in exchange for licenses, and circumstances 
indicate that the patentee would have charged that same rate to the 
defendant, the court may enter judgment in the amount of that established 
royalty. 35 Most of the time, however, the patentee cannot prove (or 
chooses not to try to prove) lost profits, and there is no established 
royalty; in these instances, the court will award a “reasonable” royalty 
instead.36 As noted above, a common articulation of the methodology for 
calculating reasonable royalties involves attempting “to ascertain the 
royalty upon which the parties would have agreed had they successfully 
negotiated an agreement just before infringement began,” that is, ex 
ante.37 In this Part, we first describe the advantages of ex ante over ex 
post methodologies generally for purposes of calculating reasonable 
royalties and then explain why the “contingent ex ante” approach is 
superior to both.  
A.  Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
The conventional rationale for the ex ante approach is that it preserves 
the patent incentive system by ensuring that the patentee is no worse off 
(but also no better off) than it would have been but for the infringement. 
This rationale explains both the availability of lost profits, in cases in 
which the patentee would have excluded the defendant but for the 
infringement, and the practice of measuring reasonable royalties based on 
the license fee the defendant would have paid had the defendant licensed 
the patent ex ante instead of infringing. Both remedies, ideally, restore 
the patentee to the position it would have occupied if the infringement 
had never happened and thus prevent infringers from undermining the 
patent incentive.  
By contrast, what we will refer to as a “pure” ex post approach—
calculating the royalty based on what the court believes the parties would 
agree to at some point after the infringer has incurred costs in reliance on 
its ability to use the infringing technology—risks making patentees much 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See COTTER, supra note 31 at 108–09. 
 35. See id. at 107–08, 108 n.130. 
 36. See id. at 108; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION 
STUDY: AS CASE VOLUME LEAPS, DAMAGES CONTINUE GENERAL DECLINE 9–10 (2014) (reporting 
that reasonable royalties were awarded in 81% of cases in which damages were awarded from 
2010–13, and lost profits in 37%). 
 37. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
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better off than they would have been but for the infringement. To 
illustrate, suppose that prior to the infringement the parties both believe 
that if the defendant uses the patented invention it will earn $1 million 
more than it would have earned from using the next-best available 
noninfringing alternative. This expected incremental profit, $1 million, is 
the economic value of the patented invention to the defendant at this point 
in time.38 Ex ante, we would expect the parties to agree to a royalty that 
splits this expected incremental profit in some manner that reflects their 
relative bargaining power—50/50, if they have equal bargaining power. 
Now suppose instead that the defendant infringes and that judgment is 
entered for the patentee. If the patentee were now to authorize the 
defendant’s continued use of the invention postjudgment (as it might, 
under the eBay decision),39 the royalty it could demand would reflect not 
only a portion of the expected incremental profit from the use of the 
patent postjudgment but also some portion of the defendant’s ex ante 
sunk costs.40 An ongoing royalty that reflects these “holdup” costs in 
addition to the expected incremental profit from the use of the patent 
confers a benefit on the patentee that is not related to the economic value 
of the patent. For example, suppose for the sake of simplicity that the 
defendant could expect to earn $2.2 million in revenue from the use of 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 21 (defining the economic value of the 
invention as the increase in profit the user “anticipates from using the patented invention 
compared to the next best alternative”). 
 39. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Post-eBay, courts award 
ongoing, postjudgment royalties when they deny prevailing patent owners injunctive relief. See 
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In calculating these 
royalties, the Federal Circuit has instructed district courts to “take into account the change in the 
parties’ bargaining positions, and the resulting change in economic circumstances, resulting from 
the determination of liability.” Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s rule risks the very problem noted in the text above, namely 
that the postjudgment royalty will be based in part on holdup costs. It also ignores the fact that, 
when calculating the royalty due for past (prejudgment) infringement, the trier of fact is told to 
estimate the amount the patentee and the defendant would have agreed to ex ante, on the 
assumption that they believed the patent to be valid and infringed. Because a judgment in favor 
of the patent owner validates this assumption, economic logic suggests that it should not alter the 
postjudgment royalty rate. See Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 
76 MO. L. REV. 695, 702–04 (2011); see also Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent 
Cases After eBay: An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 203, 219–29 (2015) (discussing awards of ongoing royalties and discussing unresolved 
issues). 
 40. More precisely, what we refer to in the text above as “sunk costs holdup” arises when 
the patentee, armed with an injunction, can extract the user’s sunk costs plus the opportunity cost 
of not having chosen a noninfringing alternative ex ante. For a formal analysis, see Norman 
Siebrasse & Thomas Cotter, Why Switching Costs Are Irrelevant to Patent Holdup, COMP. PAT. 
REMEDIES (Sept. 24, 2015, 6:38 AM), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2015/09/
why-switching-costs-are-irrelevant-to_24.html.  
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the patented invention, at a cost of implementation of $200,000, while the 
next-best alternative would earn $1.1 million at a cost of $100,000. On 
these facts, the value of the patented invention is $1 million, and a 
negotiated royalty should be some portion of that value, divided up in 
accordance with the parties’ relative bargaining power. If, however, the 
defendant has already invested $200,000 to implement the patented 
technology and then is hit with an infringement suit that may lead to an 
injunction against the use of that technology, the patentee could extract 
up to an additional $200,000 from the defendant.41 That extra $200,000—
more precisely, whatever portion of it the patentee bargains for—is 
simply a windfall to the patentee.  
In addition, if the patentee also was entitled to a royalty for past 
infringement based on what the parties would agree to now for the 
retroactive authorization of the defendant’s use, the patentee could 
attempt to extract the entire ex post value of the invention (or even more, 
unless constrained by the court).42 However, this approach threatens to 
render patent owners systematically better off than they would have been 
but for the infringement because they would garner the entire surplus 
earned from the defendant’s use.43  
Consequently, the assumption that the parties negotiate ex ante is 
necessary to ensure that the damages award reflects only the value of the 
patented invention, and not holdup costs. As the Federal Circuit has 
explained, a patentee may not “leverage its patent for competitive gain 
beyond that which the inventive contribution and value of the patent 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Intuitively, if the defendant were to abandon the technology, it could earn $1 million 
from the next-best alternative but would have invested $200,000 in sunk costs, for a net profit of 
$800,000. If instead it agrees to pay a royalty for the use of the patented invention, it will earn $2 
million minus the royalty. The patentee therefore could extract up to $1.2 million ex post, with 
the extra $200,000—the “holdup” portion of the royalty—representing the infringer’s sunk costs. 
See id.  
 42. For a formal analysis, see Jay Pil Choi, FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard 
Essential Patents 9–10 (Ctr. for Econ. Stud. & Ifo Inst., Working Paper No. 5012, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2512789. 
 43. If we assume that the parties’ ex ante estimates of patent value are on average accurate 
reflections of ex post value, allocating the entire ex post surplus to the patentee clearly makes the 
patentee better off than it would have been but for the infringement, because in the absence of 
infringement the parties almost surely would not have agreed to allocate all of the surplus to the 
patentee. Alternatively, even if the parties’ ex ante estimates are not systematically accurate, 
allocating all of the ex post value to the patentee is still, on average, likely to make patentees better 
off than they would have been but for the infringement, unless the systematic errors are extremely 
optimistic or patentees are systematically much better bargainers than implementers. See infra 
text accompanying note 60. If the parties would divide up the expected surplus on a 50/50 basis, 
for example, the actual surplus would have to be half of the expected surplus for the award of 
actual surplus to equal the royalty the patentee would have bargained for ex ante.  
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warrant.”44 On this point we agree with the general consensus. Where we 
depart from some other analysis is that, in our view, this is the only 
justification for the assumption of the ex ante negotiation. That the 
hypothetical negotiation takes place ex ante is nothing more, and nothing 
less, than a reflection of the broader principle that the damages award 
must reflect the value of the patented technology. 
One implication of this approach relates to the definition of what it 
means for a negotiation to be “ex ante.” If the negotiated license is to 
reflect only the value of the technology, and not holdup value, the 
hypothetical negotiation must take place before the infringer has incurred 
expenses in reliance on its uses of the infringing technology. That is, ex 
ante means prior to reliance by the user, and ex post means after reliance. 
This is how we use these terms in the remainder of this Article.45 In 
contrast, the conventional articulation of the willing licensor–licensee 
framework assumes that the negotiations take place just before the date 
on which the infringement begins.46 To the extent that the “just before 
infringement began” standard is taken literally, however, so that it may 
imply a negotiation after reliance by the user, it is, in our view, misguided. 
As we shall see below in the context of SEPs, for example, the 
hypothetical negotiation is47 assumed to take place before the standard is 
adopted, because the holdup problem arises as soon as the standard is 
adopted. (To be more precise, the holdup problem arises as soon as the 
user incurs sunk costs in reliance on its ability to access the standard, and 
strictly speaking under our proposed approach a court should assume that 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Apple 
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 45. If damages are calculated based on what the parties would agree to as of the date of 
judgment, for example, this is clearly an ex post approach. 
 46. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(stating that “the hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach, 
attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have agreed had they successfully 
negotiated an agreement just before infringement began”). 
 47. At least, the case law thus far has expressed this position, although the Federal Circuit 
has yet to expressly endorse it. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. 
Ill. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled 
on other grounds, Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc); 
see also In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *19 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 3, 2013) (“Modified Georgia–Pacific Factor 9 requires the court to consider the utility and 
advantages of the patented property over alternatives that could have been written into the 
standard instead of the patented technology in the period before the standard was adopted.”); 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *19 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 25, 2013) (stating that “the parties to a hypothetical negotiation under a RAND commitment 
would consider alternatives that could have been written into the standard instead of the patented 
technology. The focus is on the period before the standard was adopted and implemented (i.e., ex 
ante)”), aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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the hypothetical negotiation takes place prior to the incurring of these 
sunk costs. This date could be either before or after the date on which the 
SSO actually adopts the standard, though the two dates often may be 
close together.) The conventional approach requires only that the 
hypothetical negotiation take place prior to the first infringement, so that 
subsequent acts are deemed to be authorized. Assuming that the 
negotiation takes place prior to the adoption of the standard in the case of 
SEPs therefore is not strictly inconsistent with the conventional 
approach. 48  But neither is that timing justified or explained by the 
conventional approach; using the date of adoption of the standard rather 
than the date of first infringement is an ad hoc response to the holdup 
problem. In contrast, under our approach, using the date of adoption of 
the standard (or, better yet, the date on which the reliance costs are 
incurred) follows directly from the basic principle that the damages 
should reflect only the value of the patent technology.49  
B.  Pure Ex Ante Versus Contingent Ex Ante 
The preceding analysis demonstrates the virtues of an ex ante 
approach to royalties in comparison with an ex post approach; but nothing 
we have discussed so far necessarily requires the hypothetical ex ante 
bargain to reflect only the information that was actually available ex ante 
(what we call the “pure” ex ante approach).50 So long as the hypothetical 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Compare Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating 
that the hypothetical negotiation takes place “at a time before the infringement began”), with 
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining the 
common approach of ascertaining the royalty “just before” the infringement began). 
 49. That said, the “just before infringement began” standard can serve as an approximation 
of an ex ante approach, with the date infringement began serving as an administrable proxy for 
the date on which the defendant incurred reliance costs, insofar as the latter often might be difficult 
to pinpoint with any greater precision. See Thomas F. Cotter, Reining in Remedies in Patent 
Litigation: Three (Increasingly Immodest) Proposals, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 12 
n.45 (2013). Administrability concerns notwithstanding, though, we believe that in the context of 
SEPs, courts should assume the negotiations occur just before the standard is adopted, rather than 
just before infringement occurs, since the adoption of the standard effectively locks firms in to 
the chosen standard. Other scholars have made the same point. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra 
note 9, at 22, 189–91; see, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework 
for RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451, 1491 (2015); Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1147 (2013); Taylor, supra note 15, at 129–30. 
 50. See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 32, at 801 (using the same term for this approach).  
We hesitate to define the pure ex ante approach too precisely, for fear of being accused of setting 
up a straw person, but in broad terms, the pure ex ante approach contemplates an ex ante 
hypothetical negotiation in which the parties are assumed to have only the information that would 
actually have been available to them at that time. There is some variability in exactly what date is 
taken to be the correct date, see id. at 803–05, but it is in any event around the time of the first 
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negotiation takes place ex ante, the holdup problem is addressed equally 
well whether the parties are assumed to have only ex ante information, or 
ex post information as well. To be sure, a pure ex ante approach is one 
possibility: a court could try to make the hypothetical negotiation 
resemble, as much as possible, a real negotiation that would have taken 
place ex ante by restricting the parties’ information set to information that 
was available only as of the date on which the hypothetical negotiations 
are assumed to have taken place (call this t1). For example, the parties 
might agree to a $500,000 royalty based on their expectation that the 
defendant would earn $1 million over and above what it would earn if it 
used the next-best available noninfringing alternative.  
Alternatively, however, a court could imagine a hypothetical 
negotiation that takes place ex ante but in which the information set 
consists of all relevant information known to the parties and to the court 
ex post, i.e., as of the date of judgment (t2). Under this latter approach, 
the court tries to replicate the ex ante bargain the parties would have 
reached contingent on the state of the world being as it is at t2 (which is 
why we refer to this approach as the “contingent” ex ante approach). In 
other words, if at t2 it is proven that the defendant earned $1,500,000,51 
instead of $1,000,000, the court would estimate what royalty the parties 
would have agreed to contingent ex ante on the defendant’s earning 
$1,500,000 from the use of the patented invention. (With equal 
bargaining power, the answer is $750,000.) If instead the defendant 
earned only $500,000, the royalty would be adjusted downward (with 
equal bargaining power, to $250,000). Holdup is avoided under either 
approach. 
Although the contingent ex ante approach might seem less “real” than 
the pure ex ante approach, it is important to note that both approaches are 
fictions—that’s what a “hypothetical negotiation” means52—and that the 
                                                                                                                     
infringement. The exact date is not a key feature distinguishing the pure and contingent ex ante 
approaches, except in relation to sequential infringement. See infra Section II.C. 
 51. That is, $1,500,000 over what the defendant would have earned, ex post, from using the 
next-best noninfringing alternative. The difficulty of estimating what the defendant would have 
earned (or expected to earn) from the use of some alternative technology is an unavoidable feature 
of any approach, including both pure ex ante and pure ex post, which focuses on the value of the 
patented invention over an alternative the defendant did not actually choose.   
 52. Courts have long recognized that the hypothetical negotiation is an artificial construct. 
For example, in United States Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914), an 
important early case affirming the availability of reasonable royalties, the court stressed that a 
reasonable royalty “is not, in precise terminology, a royalty at all” but is merely the term used to 
assess damages based on general evidence “in a case where the clearer criteria did not exist.” See 
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (highlighting 
the artificiality of the willing licensor–willing licensee framework); Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & 
Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (referring to the “fantasy” of imagining “what 
warring parties would have agreed to as willing negotiators”), overruled on other grounds by 
 
17
Siebrasse and Cotter: A New Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Li
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
946 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
courts should employ the fiction that best serves the goals of the patent 
system. By most accounts, the principal goal is to promote the social good 
by encouraging individuals to create and disclose new inventions that 
otherwise would not be created and disclosed, or that would be created 
and disclosed only at higher cost or with greater delay. 53 Of course, 
patents are not the only means available for inducing creation and 
disclosure. Governments and private organizations sometimes award 
inventors prizes and grants, for example, instead of exclusive rights to 
their inventions, with the advantage being that there is no resulting 
monopoly control over those inventions.54 One disadvantage, though, is 
that the entity awarding the prize or the grant must decide in advance 
what sorts of projects are worth encouraging, and how much of a prize or 
reward will suffice to induce the invention. By contrast, a patent system 
offers exclusive rights to anyone who develops a new, useful, and 
nonobvious invention of any sort, and then leaves it up to the market to 
determine what value, if any, these inventions have. Put another way, 
patent systems are decentralized, in the sense that individual inventors 
and the firms that employ them decide what inventive projects to invest 
in; and consumers, by deciding whether they are willing to pay for the 
products that incorporate those inventions, ultimately decide the value of 
those inventions. Taking the analysis one step further, if we assume (as 
the patent system does) that market value correlates with social value,55 
                                                                                                                     
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1159 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating 
that the determination of a reasonable royalty after infringement “rests on a legal fiction”).  
 53. For discussion and citation to some of the relevant literature, see COTTER, supra note 
31, at 25–28.  
 54. See id. at 26. 
 55. We recognize that market value and social value are not identical. The social value of 
some inventions in terms of their contribution to human well-being may far exceed their market 
value, as measured by consumers’ willingness to pay. In theory, prizes and grants could be better 
at encouraging the development of these types of inventions than is the patent system. See 
Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
999, 1029–30 (2014). To the extent, however, that social value is reflected in market value, the 
market value we have in mind is consumer surplus. A patentee normally cannot capture the full 
consumer surplus because doing so requires perfect price discrimination, which is not possible. 
See id. at 1024. (This is so whether or not ex post information is used to calculate patent value 
and thus has no effect on the choice between the two approaches discussed in the text above.) In 
addition, the patentee will often share the surplus that can be captured with a licensee such as a 
manufacturer or distributor. That division of the surplus normally reflects some contribution made 
by the licensee that is necessary to the success of the patented invention, such as marketing, or 
risky investment in invention-specific manufacturing equipment. As others have noted, 
innovation—the commercialization of invention—is not the same as invention itself, and merely 
taking the invention to the point of patenting and no further is not sufficient to deliver the intended 
social benefit of the patent system. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 341, 353–54 (2010). The other factors that are necessary to commercial success of a 
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it is fair to state that the patent system is intended to motivate inventors 
to create and disclose new inventions that will have substantial social 
value.  
If this reasoning is correct, several observations follow. The first is 
that remedies, including damages, should support the incentive system 
sketched out above by ensuring that inventors receive appropriate 
compensation for their inventions. Second, in determining what 
appropriate compensation is, it is important to recognize that the ultimate 
goal is not to enrich inventors, but to provide them with an incentive to 
innovate for the social good.56 Rewarding inventors is a means, not an 
end. Third, it follows from these premises that the compensation awarded 
inventors should be commensurate with the invention’s market, and 
hence social, value.57 An inventor who creates something that consumers 
do not want, or for which there are better substitutes, should receive much 
less than someone whose invention substantially advances the state of art. 
Fourth, in general one would expect actual licenses, voluntarily 
negotiated by the parties without resort to the courts, to reflect informed 
actors’ best estimates of the market value of the licensed inventions. 
Fifth, if this last premise is correct, the pure ex ante approach to 
reasonable royalties serves the patent system by (ideally) recreating 
exactly what would have happened but for the infringement. If the 
patentee would have licensed the invention to a willing licensee in the 
position of the defendant, the patentee receives (what the court estimates 
to be) the value of that license. This award preserves the patent incentive 
by providing compensation that should reflect actual market value, and 
which therefore should be commensurate with social value. 
It is one thing to note that restoring the but-for world generally serves 
the purpose of providing compensation that is commensurate with the 
value of the invention; it is quite another to elevate restoration to a 
foundational principle in its own right. To do so mistakes the means for 
the end. Going back to our example from above, suppose that ex ante the 
parties would have believed that using the patent would increase the 
defendant’s profits by $1 million. Ex post, things may turn out better or 
                                                                                                                     
patented invention require their own reward. See infra Subsections I.C.3, II.E.1. Finally, a longer-
term view of social value would include not just static but also “dynamic” or long-run efficiency, 
which itself depends on innovation. Arguably a system that would allow the patentee to extract 
all of the social value of an invention would undermine dynamic efficiency by unnecessarily 
increasing transaction costs and reducing spillover benefits. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra 
note 20, at 268, 278.  
 56. See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 9, at 529 (arguing that the “aim of patent law is 
optimally promoting innovation, not protecting private harms”); Taylor, supra note 15, at 116–
17 (citing other sources that support the proposition that reasonable royalties should provide 
incentive for patent owners to invent and nothing more).  
 57. See supra note 55. 
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worse: for example, the patent actually may earn the defendant an added 
$1,500,000, or only $500,000. Either way, the contingent ex ante 
approach better correlates the patentee’s reward with the invention’s 
actual social value as disclosed by subsequent events. If the invention is 
more valuable than the parties expected, the patentee receives a greater 
reward; if it is less valuable, she receives a lesser one. By contrast, the 
pure ex ante approach confers an award that reflects the parties’ ex ante 
mistakes, potentially resulting in either a modest award for a highly 
valuable invention or an undeserved windfall for a relatively useless one. 
The problem may be magnified if, as is perhaps more likely, the parties’ 
ex ante estimates of patent value would not have been identical.58 As we 
will see, for example, under the pure approach, it is possible for the 
patentee to receive much less than the true value of the invention solely 
because the infringer is mistaken ex ante about the patent’s value, even 
though the patentee is not.59  
To be sure, in principle, the pure ex ante approach and the contingent 
ex ante approach will both provide exactly the same incentive to invent 
so long as the ex ante expectations of the parties are systematically 
accurate; inaccuracies in individual cases would, in the aggregate, cancel 
each other out. Behavioral economics, however, suggests that it is overly 
optimistic to suppose that the parties’ expectations are systematically 
accurate. 60 In any event, the parties’ expectations cannot possibly be 
more accurate than the actual value as revealed with full information. The 
contingent approach must be at least as good as the ex ante approach, and 
barring heroic assumptions about rationality, it is almost certainly 
superior because it more accurately reflects the true value of the 
invention. 
In addition, even if the parties’ expectations are accurate on average, 
which is unlikely, the fact that they are inaccurate in individual cases 
implies that the contingent approach is also more efficient when courts 
award ongoing reasonable royalties in lieu of an injunction. If a court uses 
the pure ex ante approach, then the royalties may be too high or too low 
relative to the value contributed by the invention.61 For example, suppose 
                                                                                                                     
 58. For example, if the patent owner estimates that the defendant will earn $2 million and 
the defendant estimates it will earn only $1 million, a deal (if one is struck at all) will be for less 
than $1 million. If the estimates are the other way around, the deal will tend toward the higher 
figure. Depending on whose estimate is better, the patentee’s earning will be closer or farther 
away from the invention’s social value. 
 59. See infra Section II.D. 
 60. See Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1655–56 (2009) 
(citing some of the relevant literature); cf. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect 
Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 
GEO. L.J. 67, 76–78 (2002) (arguing in favor of a more empirically grounded approach to 
rationality and against unreflectively assuming systematic rationality or irrationality).  
 61. See supra note 39.  
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the parties believed that a particular invention would be a very attractive 
feature of a product such as a smartphone and so would have negotiated 
a substantial royalty; but that by the time of trial, it is apparent that 
consumers are entirely indifferent to the feature. If the feature is difficult 
to design around in the near term, consumers wind up paying a substantial 
royalty for a feature they do not want–and which we know they do not 
want–and this will depress demand and inefficiently restrict distribution 
of the device. 
In summary, the patent system is intended to encourage the production 
of valuable inventions by providing a reward that is commensurate with 
the invention’s social value. Using ex post knowledge about the actual 
value of the invention provides a more accurate incentive. It is true that 
in the great majority of cases, where the parties actually license rather 
than infringe, they bargain using only ex ante information, and 
consequently damages assessed using ex post knowledge will be different 
from the reward that would have been gained from the actual negotiation. 
But the incomplete information encountered in actual negotiations is not 
in itself a desirable feature that merits emulation and encouragement. 
Actual licenses are desirable despite the fact that they provide an 
imperfect reward because the administrative and holdup costs associated 
with attempting to assess all licenses with ex post information would 
create even worse problems. The reward is less perfect with actual 
licensing, but the transaction costs are much lower, so that on the whole 
actual licensing is better than litigation. But if litigation has actually 
occurred, it is better to use the most accurate information available in 
assessing the patent reward.  
C.  Additional Reasons to Prefer the Contingent Ex Ante Approach 
Although the principal reason for preferring the contingent to the pure 
ex ante approach is that the former better correlates rewards with social 
value, there are several other reasons why the contingent approach is 
superior. Among these are, first, that the contingent approach provides a 
unified explanation for certain features of existing law; second, that it 
reduces adjudication costs; and third, that it ensures that patentees will 
“pay” only for services actually provided by the infringer. 
1.  Unified Explanation 
First off, the contingent approach provides a unified explanation for 
certain features of existing law that otherwise can be justified only on an 
ad hoc basis. As noted in the Introduction, for example, for purposes of 
determining reasonable royalties, courts assume that the parties to the 
hypothetical negotiation believed the patent in suit to be valid and 
infringed, even though ex ante there usually would be some doubt as to 
both validity and infringement; validity and infringement can only be 
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conclusively established through litigation.62 The conventional explanation 
for this assumption is that it is necessary to avoid a double-discounting 
problem. To illustrate, suppose that the parties would agree to a $1 
million royalty ex ante if they knew the patent to be valid and infringed, 
but in reality they each believe there is only a 70% probability of validity 
and an independent 80% probability of infringement. The license they 
would actually negotiate would be appropriately discounted, to $560,000. 
If the defendant infringes, however, and the patentee files suit, the 
patentee knows that it only has a 56% chance (70% x 80%) of obtaining 
a favorable judgment. If the amount of a favorable judgment is the actual 
$560,000 the parties would have negotiated, the patentee’s expected 
payoff from going to trial is only $313,600 (56% x 560,000), which 
means that she can expect to be worse off as a result of the infringement 
(in comparison with having licensed the patent). The assumption of 
validity and infringement corrects for this problem by awarding the 
patentee $1 million if she prevails, so that her expectation pretrial is 
$560,000, exactly the amount she would have agreed to ex ante.63 While 
we have no quarrel with the economic logic of the preceding analysis, the 
assumption of validity and infringement follows directly and more simply 
from the contingent ex ante approach. $1 million is the royalty the parties 
would have agreed to ex ante had they known—not just made 
probabilistic determinations—that the patent was valid and infringed.  
A similar analysis can be used to justify awards of running royalties. 
Outside the litigation context, licensors and licensees sometimes agree 
that the licensee will pay, in lieu of a lump-sum, paid-in-full royalty, a 
periodic royalty consisting of an agreed-upon rate multiplied by the dollar 
value of an agreed-upon base, the value of which base is determined ex 
post (for example, annual sales revenue). 64  Courts often mimic this 
approach when awarding reasonable royalties by awarding a reasonable 
royalty determined by an ex ante rate multiplied by an ex post base.65 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Empirical evidence indicates that over 40% of all patents that are litigated to judgment 
are found to be invalid, and that patentee win rates hover around the 30% mark. See John R. 
Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent 
Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1787 (2014).   
 63. See Kalos & Putnam, supra note 25, at 4; see also Jay Pil Choi, Alternative Damage 
Rules and Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights: Unjust Enrichment, Lost Profits, and 
Reasonable Royalty Remedies, 21 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 145, 155 (2009) (arguing that the use of 
ex post information is necessary to cure this problem); Taylor, supra note 15, at 115–16 (noting 
that there is also a circularity issue in that the discounted value negotiated by the parties is 
reflected in the damages award and knowing this, the parties further discount the negotiated price, 
and so on).  
 64. There are various reasons why the parties might prefer a running royalty to a lump-sum 
(paid-in-full) royalty and vice versa. See infra Part II; see also Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Patent 
Licenses, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 423, 425–27 (2004) (discussing and providing an illustration 
of the “25 Percent Rule running royalty rate”). 
 65. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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Again, the practice is fully consistent with the contingent approach: the 
court is constructing the royalty the parties would have agreed to ex ante, 
had they been able to foresee the extent of the infringer’s sales.  
To be sure, one could view the practice of awarding reasonable 
royalties on a “running” basis as consistent with the pure ex ante 
approach, to the extent it is the approach the parties themselves would 
have agreed to ex ante. The contingent approach nevertheless provides a 
single rationale for both the assumption of validity and infringement and 
for awards of running royalties. It also suggests that courts could award 
running royalties even when there is no evidence from which to 
determine whether the parties would have negotiated a running or a lump-
sum royalty, a practice that would be harder to justify on a pure ex ante 
basis. 
Finally, the contingent approach is consistent with Justice Cardozo’s 
discussion of the “book of wisdom” principle in Sinclair Refining.66 
To correct uncertain prophecies in [assessing damages] is 
not to charge the offender with elements of value non-
existent at the time of his offense. It is to bring out and 
expose to light the elements of value that were there from the 
beginning.  
. . . . An imaginary bid by an imaginary buyer, acting upon 
the information available at the moment of the breach, is not 
the limit of recovery where the subject of the bargain is an 
undeveloped patent. Information at such a time might be so 
scanty and imperfect that the offer would be nominal. The 
promisee of the patent has less than fair compensation if the 
criterion of value is the price that he would have received if 
he had disposed of it at once, irrespective of the value that 
would have been uncovered if he had kept it as his own.67 
Our argument is that these statements are correct, for the right reasons, 
when taken at face value. The first quoted paragraph encapsulates our 
argument for the use of ex post information, which is that it more 
accurately captures the true value of the invention. The second quoted 
paragraph explicitly contemplates that even if the bargain that actually 
would be struck at the time of the breach would be for a very small 
amount, the appropriate measure of damages is the higher amount 
reflecting the value that would later have been uncovered. This is 
consistent with the contingent approach and inconsistent with the pure ex 
ante approach.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698–99 (1933). 
 67. Id. 
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It is true that Sinclair can be reconciled with the pure ex ante approach 
by interpreting it to mean that ex post information should be used solely 
as a proxy for ex ante expectations.68 Indeed, there are numerous lower 
court decisions that either expressly or implicitly interpret Sinclair in 
precisely this manner. 69  But our interpretation of Sinclair is more 
straightforward: it means exactly what it appears to say on its face. 
Moreover, the contingent ex ante approach accounts for the use of ex post 
information much more directly, as evidence of the value of the 
invention, and thus offers a simpler and more elegant unifying theory of 
various aspects of the law of damages. 
2.  Adjudication and Error Costs 
A second reason to favor the contingent ex ante approach, which 
follows from the discussion above, relates to administrability; rather than 
trying to construct the parties’ ex ante expectations of the invention’s 
profitability, the trier of fact can employ real, ex post, information 
instead. The use of real information, where it is available, should reduce 
both adjudication costs (because it’s easier to prove real numbers than 
hypothetical ones) and error or uncertainty costs (for the same reason). 
More subtly, the contingent approach also may reduce adjudicative costs 
by discouraging persons with patents that had probabilistic value ex ante 
but prove to be worthless ex post from litigating.70 This selection bias in 
the mix of cases parties will litigate also is beneficial if, as we argued 
above, there is no good reason to confer a substantial reward on patents 
that turn out to have little value.71 
                                                                                                                     
 68. See Gooding, supra note 24 (“In general, the cases establish that the only purpose of 
the book of wisdom is to permit consideration of ex post data that constitute inferential evidence 
of a particular value determined in the past.”).  
 69. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1988), 
overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge v. Dana Corp., 383 
F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 70. This assumes that persons holding patents that ex ante appeared to have low value but 
that ex post are shown to have high value will be likely to sue under either approach—a reasonable 
assumption, we think, as long as injunctive relief or substantial ongoing royalties are potentially 
available.  
 71. By contrast, a pure ex ante approach could marginally undermine the incentive to 
invent. Even assuming that the parties’ estimates of the value of the invention are correct on 
average, on the pure ex ante approach an individual patentee whose invention turns out to be more 
valuable than the parties anticipated will be undercompensated relative to her contribution to the 
art. The average incentive to invent therefore will be maintained only if individual patentees 
whose inventions turn out to be less valuable than anticipated also sue successfully and are 
awarded damages that are over-compensatory in the individual case. Cases such as Monsanto 
notwithstanding, one might wonder whether courts often would be willing to award damages that 
are clearly over-compensatory in specific cases, even if such awards are required by legal 
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That said, we recognize that there may be cases in which the use of ex 
ante information is superior because evidence of ex post information is 
poor, nonexistent, or otherwise extremely costly to obtain. If a court had 
clear evidence of the parties’ ex ante expectations, for example, but for 
some reason could not obtain an accurate estimate of the number of sales 
the defendant actually made ex post, it clearly would be better to use the 
ex ante information than to blindly guess about ex post. In Part II, we 
provide some specific examples of when, contrary to general 
expectations, the pure ex ante approach may generate lower adjudicative 
and other administrability costs.72 Nevertheless, in the general run of 
cases, the contingent ex ante approach should reduce those costs. In either 
case, there is a single overarching principle: the courts should use the 
information that best reflects the true value of the invention.   
3.  Payment for Services Rendered 
For reasons that parallel parts of the analysis above, some 
commentators have argued in favor of abandoning the hypothetical 
negotiation framework altogether.73 While we agree with many of the 
                                                                                                                     
principle and necessary to maintain the incentive to invent on average. In any event, a direct 
implication of the pure ex ante approach is that a patentee should receive a substantial damages 
award if the parties thought the invention was valuable at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, 
even if the invention turns out to be entirely worthless. This seems pointless as a matter of patent 
policy and generates unnecessary adjudicative costs to boot.   
 72. See infra Section II.H. 
 73. See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 32, at 810–12 (proposing, however, the “continued 
consideration of a hypothetical license heuristic as a means to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
proposed damages award” based on incremental benefits, licensing comparables, and design-
around costs); SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 33, at 15 (proposing that courts should consider 
“what fully informed and reasonable persons in the position of the patent owner . . . and the 
infringer would agree to at the time of trial”); see also Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting 
Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of 
Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1028–31 (1999) (proposing that 
awards of “partial damages” equal to a substantial but less than 100% portion of the patentee’s 
loss would increase social welfare while maintaining incentives); Bernard Chao, The Infringement 
Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1365 (2014) (emphasizing the need for damages to 
optimize incentives for innovation); Sichelman, supra note 9, at 552, 554 (arguing that, ideally, 
courts would align ex ante and ex post incentives, that is, award damages sufficient to maintain 
the patent incentive, which could be higher or lower than the patentee’s but-for damages). 
By contrast, in a recent paper Greg Sidak argues that courts only should consider ex ante 
value because otherwise defendants will have a “free option to infringe” and pay relatively low 
damages whenever the ex post world reveals that the invention was less valuable than would have 
been assumed ex ante. See J. Gregory Sidak, How Relevant Is Justice Cardozo’s “Book of 
Wisdom” to Patent Damages?, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 256, 286 (2016), 
https://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/justice-cardozos-book-of-wisdom-and-patent-damage 
s.pdf. As we demonstrate in the text above, however—and as Sidak himself recognizes—the 
damages awarded under a contingent ex ante approach could be lower or higher than under the 
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specific criticisms levelled at the hypothetical negotiation construct,74 we 
are inclined to think that it is better to fix the hypothetical negotiation 
framework than to abandon it.75 
One reason for retaining the hypothetical negotiation construct is 
largely negative: it must be made to serve at least until something better 
comes along. For example, Professor Ted Sichelman argues that patents 
are intended to promote innovation but that the current remedial structure 
is “fundamentally flawed” because of its focus on the essentially private 
goal of making the patentee whole.76 He argues that the courts should 
therefore deviate from “make-whole” damages when necessary to align 
the remedy with the optimal incentive to innovate. 77 Doing so would be 
informationally very demanding, however, as Professor Sichelman 
acknowledges.78 While we agree that the focus of patent damages should 
be on promoting innovation rather than making the patentee whole, our 
proposal is both more modest—it preserves the basic structure of the 
“make-whole” remedy—and more tractable—it would make assessment 
of damages easier, not more complex.  
This leads us to our second, and more positive, argument in favor of 
the hypothetical negotiation framework. In broad terms, a common 
economic approach to reasonable royalties posits that one would first 
determine the incremental profit due to the patented invention as 
compared with the next best noninfringing alternative, and then split that 
incremental profit between the parties.79 In an actual license agreement, 
                                                                                                                     
pure ex ante approach; and in our view, awarding damages in excess of the patent’s worth as 
revealed ex post, which Sidak appears to approve, is a shortcoming, not a desirable aspect, of the 
pure ex ante framework. Moreover, in other work one of us has critiqued an earlier statement of 
Sidak’s “free option” argument for failing to account for other factors that may deter infringement 
even if royalties are set at the amount willing parties themselves would have negotiated. See 
Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Royalties, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 
1183–84 n.157 (2009). For analogous reasons, we disagree with Mr. Lee and Professor 
Melamed’s argument that ex post information necessarily leads to higher damages awards. See 
William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 385, 412, 416 (2016). 
 74. See, e.g., Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 32, at 785–89 (critiquing certain aspects of the 
hypothetical ex ante bargain approach). 
 75. For example, it is understood that the parties to an actual negotiation will take into 
account uncertainty as to the validity of the patent, but it is now established law that the parties to 
the hypothetical negotiation should assume that the patent is valid and infringed. See supra note 
63 and accompanying text. We view our proposal that ex post information should be taken into 
account as an improvement to the hypothetical negotiation construct in a similar vein. 
 76. See Sichelman, supra note 9, at 566.  
 77. See id. at 566–67.   
 78. See id. at 564–66.   
 79. See Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies 
Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 901 (2011); Zelin Yang, Damaging Royalties: An Overview of 
Reasonable Royalty Damages, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 671 (2014) (discussing incremental 
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both parties bring something to the table in the process of turning an 
invention into a commercially valuable revenue-generating product. The 
patentee’s most obvious contribution is the invention, but bringing the 
final product to market generally requires further development and 
technical implementation, such as clinical trials, as well as marketing, 
manufacturing, and distribution, all of which require further investment 
at risk beyond the investment made by the patentee in the invention itself. 
Either of the parties may provide these further services, and the way the 
parties split the incremental profit in an actual negotiation depends on 
who provides what services and the relative importance and cost of those 
services. As is correctly reflected in the Georgia-Pacific factors, the 
hypothetical negotiation construct ensures that the provision of these 
services will be taken into account for purposes of awarding reasonable 
royalties, just as they are taken into account by the parties to an actual 
negotiation.80 In our view, this means ensuring that the contribution made 
by the infringer to the incremental profit from sales of the patented 
invention is recognized, as well as the patentee’s contribution of the 
invention itself. 
With regard to services provided by the infringer, however, the 
contingent ex ante approach does a better job than does the pure ex ante 
approach in ensuring that the patent owner “pays” only for services the 
infringer actually provides, and not for services it doesn’t. For example, 
suppose that the infringer’s marketing efforts result in the patented 
invention being much more widely used than the parties would have 
                                                                                                                     
profits and noting that “a patent is only as valuable as what it is able to contribute over the next-
best non-infringing alternative”).  
 80. See Georgia-Pacific Co. v. U.S. Plywood Co., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) 
(listing, as factor number 13, “[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the 
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, 
or significant features or improvements added by the infringer”), modified on other grounds, 446 
F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). See also U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 210 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914) 
(“The jury can learn how much of the realizable profit should be credited to the manufacturing 
process and business risk and how much to the patent, also, what share of the profits or of the 
selling price it may be customary in that or similar business to allow for the use of such an 
invention.”); Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 32, at 815–16; Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost 
Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 663 (2009); Eric E. Bensen & 
Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment To Rein in the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 47 (2008); Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Patent Licenses, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L .J. 423 (2004). Other countries’ laws recognize the point as well. See, e.g., THOMAS KÜHNEN, 
PATENT LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS IN GERMANY 542 (6th ed., Frank Peterreins trans., 2013) (noting 
that among the factors that counsel in favor of reducing royalty damages is “the achievement of 
particularly high turnover levels . . . if the high turnover is attributable to the fact that the infringer 
is a company of repute (with the corresponding financial muscle, advertising, manufacturing 
capacity and distribution organization and corresponding customer service and corresponding 
business connections)”).  
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expected ex ante. The profit earned from the unauthorized use therefore 
will be higher than expected, and under the contingent ex ante approach, 
the patentee should receive some of the benefit of that unanticipated 
success. At the same time, the rate also should reflect the provision of 
marketing services by the infringer, whether the parties themselves would 
have foreseen them ex ante or not; otherwise the infringer’s incentive to 
efficiently market products is marginally reduced. By contrast, if an 
actual licensee similarly situated to the infringer would have provided 
marketing services for the invention, but the infringer did not do so, a 
court should be careful in using a license that requires licensees to 
perform these services as evidence of the ex ante deal the patentee and 
infringer would have struck.81 Otherwise, the infringer in effect receives 
payment for services it never provided simply because the parties would 
have anticipated that an authorized licensee would.82  
As with our running royalty example, one might argue that even under 
the pure ex ante approach this latter result is avoided if it is clear that the 
parties would have negotiated a royalty that reflects only the value of 
services that the infringer actually provided. Our approach, however, 
allows courts to reach this result without having to consider whether, on 
the information set they would have had before them ex ante, the parties 
actually would have negotiated such terms, explicitly or implicitly. The 
pure ex ante approach, in contrast, would either permit the use of ex post 
information only on an ad hoc basis, or risk paying the infringer for 
services that it did not provide. 
There is a more general point to be made. Whether the reasonable 
royalty is assessed using the hypothetical negotiation construct or by 
some other methodology, the incremental profits made available by the 
patented technology must be split between the parties according to their 
relative contribution to the commercially successful product that 
embodies the patented technology. Whatever particular methodology is 
used, the use of ex post information under the contingent ex ante 
approach provides more accurate compensation for the provision of only 
those services (including the service of developing the invention!) that 
were actually rendered, than does a pure ex ante approach, which looks 
to the contribution that the parties would have expected to make. The 
contingent ex ante approach allows a better assessment of the true value 
of the patented invention, and by the same token, it allows a better 
assessment of the true value of each parties’ contribution to the 
commercially successful innovation.  
                                                                                                                     
 81. Courts frequently use comparable licenses for guidance in determining what the 
patentee and infringer would have agreed to. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 
(discussing factors one, two, and twelve).  
 82. Cf. COTTER, supra note 31, at 269 & n.186 (noting that German and French courts may 
adjust the amount of a reasonable royalty when the infringer has avoided certain risks or costs that 
a real-world licensee would have shouldered).  
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In summary, the simple intuition that a patentee should receive a large 
reward for a valuable invention, and a small reward for a useless one, is 
correct. There is no good reason why the parties’ errors regarding the 
value of the invention, whether idiosyncratic or systematic, should affect 
the patentee’s reward. With that said, we recognize that there will be 
instances in which the ex ante and contingent ex ante approaches 
converge on the same result and that, notwithstanding the contingent 
approach’s greater administrability, there may be specific instances in 
which administrability cuts in favor of the pure ex ante approach instead. 
Nonetheless, the point remains that the presumption should be in favor of 
using ex post information, and any departure from that principle must be 
specially justified.  
II.  SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS 
In this Part, we explain a variety of specific applications of the 
contingent ex ante approach. As we shall see, some of these applications 
make the most intuitive sense if we emphasize the contingent approach’s 
role in estimating the true value of the patented invention. Others make 
more intuitive sense if we emphasize how the contingent approach avoids 
requiring the patentee to “pay” for services not provided by the infringer, 
while a few fall into both camps. Finally, some fact patterns demonstrate 
the need to fall back on the pure ex ante approach as a matter of 
administrability. 
We begin with a discussion of SEPs before moving on to 
consideration of the impact of unexpected exogenous events, separate and 
distinct infringements, regulatory uncertainty, lump-sum versus running 
royalties, and noninfringing alternatives. We conclude with some 
thoughts on administrability. 
A.  Standard Essential Patents 
As noted in the Introduction, although SSOs typically require their 
members to commit to licensing their SEPs on a FRAND basis, to date 
most SSOs have not attempted to define what a FRAND royalty is or how 
it should be calculated.83 Our analysis so far, however, has suggested that 
courts faced with the task of determining what a FRAND royalty is in a 
given case should avoid the pure ex post approach—that is, calculating 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. One notable exception is the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, which recently amended its bylaws relating to FRAND 
royalties in certain respects. INST. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 16, 
§ 6.1; Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 19, at 9, 43–44, 50 (discussing the new bylaw’s requirement 
that a FRAND royalty should comprise “appropriate compensation to the patent holder for the 
practice of an Essential Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of 
that Essential Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard”). 
 
29
Siebrasse and Cotter: A New Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Li
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
958 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
the royalty based on what reasonable parties would agree to after the 
infringer has incurred costs in reliance on the infringing technology—
because that approach would enable the patent owner to extract value that 
is unrelated to the invention’s contribution to the state of the art. This is 
consistent with the general trend of the scholarship and case law so far.84 
As discussed above, as a general matter the ex post approach would allow 
the patent owner to extract a royalty that is based in part on the infringer’s 
sunk costs, which bear no relationship to the value of the invention over 
that alternative.85 For products that incorporate hundreds or thousands of 
SEPs, such royalties may be wildly disproportionate to the value of the 
invention.86 
The preceding analysis implies that in assessing royalties for the 
infringing pre- and postjudgment use of SEPs, courts should avoid holdup 
by assuming that the hypothetical negotiation on which the royalty is 
based takes place before the user has incurred costs in reliance on the 
infringing technology. The question nevertheless remains whether the 
pure or contingent ex ante approach is preferable for calculating FRAND 
royalties. As we have seen, under the pure approach the goal is to restore 
the patentee to the position it would have enjoyed but for the 
infringement, so that the hypothetical negotiations take place subject to 
whatever uncertainties would have confronted the parties ex ante.87 The 
contingent approach, in contrast, attempts to replicate the bargain the 
parties would have made ex ante, subject to full information regarding 
patent value.88 Because both approaches assume that the hypothetical 
negotiation takes place before any reliance on the part of the user, they 
both avoid holdup. Both therefore are superior to the ex post approach, 
but the contingent approach better serves the goals of the patent system.  
To see the reasons for adopting the contingent approach, consider the 
kind of contract the parties would enter into if it were practical to do so 
before the standard was adopted. Assume that a potential user begins 
incurring costs in reliance on its ability to market a standard-compliant 
device, whatever standard winds up being adopted, prior to the adoption 
of the standard, and the user therefore wishes to enter into ex ante licenses 
to avoid the possibility of being held up. Prior to adoption, the value of 
any particular potential SEP will be discounted by the fact that it is one 
of many contenders for inclusion in the standard. (Even a team favored 
                                                                                                                     
 84. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 47, 49. 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 38–44. 
 86. Since the defendant could not afford to pay another such royalty for the infringement of 
any other SEP, one might think that the parties and other members of the affected industry would 
have an incentive to avoid such unsustainable royalty stacking. Maybe so, but even if one could 
be confident that such efforts would succeed, there is no obvious reason for courts to create a 
problem that they could avoid simply by using a better valuation technique. 
 87. See discussion supra Section I.A.  
 88. See discussion supra Section I.B.  
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to win the Super Bowl faces long odds at the start of the playoffs.) In the 
extreme, the ex ante value of any particular patent might be effectively 
zero. The result is that because of this discounting problem, a pure ex ante 
negotiation will not reflect the actual contribution of the patent to the 
standard. As above, the fundamental principle motivating our analysis is 
that the damages award should reflect the value of the invention, neither 
more nor less.  
Formally, the problem is exactly the same as the double-discounting 
problem, which is solved by the assumption that the parties to the 
hypothetical negotiation know that the patent is valid and infringed.89 We 
begin with the simplest possible case. Suppose that an SSO is deciding 
between two standards: Standard X, which incorporates Patent X, and 
Standard Y, which incorporates a public-domain technology. Assume 
further that each SSO member/standard user is allowed to vote on, but 
cannot by itself control, which standard the SSO will adopt. Ex ante, each 
user U estimates the probability p that the SSO will choose Standard X 
or Standard Y and the profit π it expects to earn under each scenario. 
Assume also that Patent X is known to be valid at the time the SSO is 
choosing the standard, and it is known to be truly essential to Standard 
X.90 Finally, assume that each user decides just prior to standard adoption 
whether to negotiate a license for Patent X. User U’s expected payoff 
from negotiating a license therefore is  
 
px(πx – Rx) + (1 – px)(πy – Rx) = pxπx + (1 – px)πy – Rx      (1), 
 
where Rx is the royalty the licensee pays to the patent owner. (For 
simplicity, we assume here that the royalty is a lump sum. Changing it to 
a running royalty would introduce a mathematical complication that is 
unnecessary to the point we are illustrating.) U’s expected payoff if it 
does not negotiate a license—and therefore, absent infringement, does 
not participate in the market at all if the SSO chooses Standard X—sets 
U’s maximum willingness to pay for a license. This is simply 
 
(1 – px)πy           (2). 
 
On these facts, and assuming that the patentee’s minimum willingness 
to accept is 0, we would expect the parties to negotiate a license under 
which 0 < Rx < pxπx. We can further define this negotiated royalty Rx as 
bpxπx, where b is a measure of the patentee’s bargaining power and 0 < 
b < 1. (Thus with equal bargaining power, b = 0.5 and Rx = 0.5pxπx.) As 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.1. 
 90. This is unlikely to be true in practice, but we make this assumption so that the standard 
problem of double discounting due to uncertainty regarding validity and infringement does not 
arise. This ensures that the parallel double discounting problem which we identify is distinct. 
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a result, and regardless of whether the SSO chooses Standard X or 
Standard Y, the patent owner’s expected licensing revenue from U is  
 
Rx = bpxπx             (3),  
 
and U’s expected payoff is 
 
pxπx + (1 – px)πy - Rx = (1 – b)pxπx + (1 – px)πy        (4). 
 
This is the contract the parties would write if they constrained themselves 
to contract using only information they actually had at the time of ex ante 
negotiation. It corresponds to the pure ex ante approach of assessing a 
reasonable royalty.  
Alternatively, suppose that contingent contracts are possible and that 
U agrees to pay Rx only on the contingency that the SSO chooses 
Standard X. Such a contract effectively allows the parties to use ex post 
information, and it corresponds to the contingent approach to assessing a 
reasonable royalty. U’s expected payoff from entering into such a 
contract is 
 
px(πx – Rx) + (1 – px)πy = pxπx + (1 – px)πy - pxRx       (5), 
 
and its expected payoff from not agreeing to the contract is, as before, (1 
– px)πy. Now we would expect the parties to agree to a contingent license 
under which 0 < Rx < πx and R = bπx. U’s expected payoff with a 
contingent contract is  
 
pxπx + (1 – px)πy - bpxπx = (1 - b)pxπx + (1 – px)πy       (6). 
 
Even though the royalty for the use of Patent X is higher under the 
contingent contract if the SSO adopts Standard X (bπx, rather than 
bpxπx), the expected profit to both the user (compare equation 4 and 
equation 6) and the patent owner (bpxπx) is the same under either 
approach because the lower payment is paid and received with certainty 
under the pure approach.91 
We are now ready to introduce some complications. Suppose that the 
parties do not negotiate a contract ex ante, the SSO adopts Standard X, U 
infringes, and a court must determine the appropriate royalty. Should the 
court award the patent owner bpxπx (the amount the parties would have 
agreed to ex ante under the pure approach) or bπx (the amount they would 
have agreed to under the contingent approach)? The correct answer is the 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Of course, the parties may choose one option over the other to shift risk. See discussion 
infra Subsection II.E.1. 
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latter. Under the pure approach, the patent owner’s ex ante (pre-adoption) 
expected revenue if U subsequently infringes her patent is bpx2πx because 
she can expect to receive payment only if the SSO chooses Standard X, 
the ex ante probability of which is px. The probability that the SSO will 
adopt Standard X is reflected twice, once in the probability of actually 
receiving payment, and again in the court’s assessment of damages. This 
is exactly the problem which justifies the assumption of validity and 
infringement, with the probability that the SSO adopts the standard, 
playing the role of uncertain enforcement and validity.92 Alternatively, if 
the court awards bπx, the patent owner’s ex ante expected revenue is 
bpxπx, exactly what she could have expected to earn if the parties had 
negotiated ex ante.  
It is therefore clear that the court should not discount the royalty based 
on the ex ante probability that the SSO would reject Standard X—
assuming that it were even possible to estimate that probability—because 
doing so would introduce a double-discounting problem and thus make 
the patent owner worse off than she would have been, absent the 
infringement.93 Instead, the court should attempt to construct the royalty 
the parties would have agreed to ex ante, contingent on the patent in suit 
being incorporated into the standard. 
The question is how this conclusion should be justified. One might 
attempt to justify it under the pure ex ante approach on the ground that a 
FRAND commitment is in fact a contingent contract, and that in awarding 
a royalty of bπx, the courts are simply awarding damages based on the 
contract the parties would have entered into (or, in fact, did enter into)—
just as courts routinely award damages based on a running royalty when 
the facts suggest that the parties would have agreed to such a royalty.94  
There are two problems with this response. First, it depends on the 
construction of the particular FRAND commitment or comparable 
commitments. If the commitment in question is not construed as a 
contingent contract, then the patent owner would only be entitled to the 
discounted royalty, thus impairing the patent incentive by providing a 
reward that is less than the patent’s actual contribution. Alternatively, 
what if the patent in question is in fact essential to the standard but was 
not declared as such and was not subject to a FRAND commitment? Does 
this mean that such a patent is entitled to only the discounted royalty 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 93. As stated earlier, restoring the but-for world is not an end in itself, but it often does 
serve the purpose of ensuring that the patentee receives compensation commensurate with the 
social value of the invention. See supra pp. 14–15. In the present context, the contingent approach 
may result in a higher or lower value for πx than the parties might have anticipated, but surely 
there is no reason to think that the double discounting effect the contingent approach eliminates 
would advance the goal of correlating private and social value. 
 94. See, e.g., Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
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because it was not subject to a contingent contract? It seems 
counterintuitive to suppose that a patent owner who had not made a 
FRAND commitment should be in a substantially worse position than one 
who had. A response to this might be to say that all FRAND commitments 
are necessarily contingent contracts, and for patents that are in fact SEPs, 
though not declared as such and so not expressly subject to the FRAND 
commitment, the comparable licenses are also FRAND licenses. In effect, 
all patents that are in fact SEPs would be deemed subject to a contingent 
contract. But such an approach would not really be consistent with the 
pure ex ante approach, which seeks to place the parties in the position 
they in fact would have been in but for the infringement. An approach 
that ignores the particular facts to arrive at the result that is correct as a 
matter of policy amounts to a rejection of the pure ex ante approach, or 
at best an ad hoc distortion of it. 
A second response is to accept the assumption that the parties 
negotiate with knowledge that the patent will be incorporated into the 
standard, even though this is not true in fact, but to characterize it as a 
narrow exception to the general rule against using ex post information, 
just as one might view the assumption of validity and infringement  as a 
narrow exception. On this view, this analysis shows only that the 
reasonable royalty should be calculated on the assumption that the parties 
knew that the patent would be incorporated into the standard that was 
adopted, but that it does not compel the conclusion that the parties should 
be assumed to have had all ex post information, including information 
about the success of the standard itself and the products incorporating it. 
The difficulty with this position is that the counterfactual assumption that 
the parties know the patent will be adopted as part of the standard is 
purely ad hoc. It has no principled basis in the pure ex ante approach. The 
pure ex ante approach rests on the principle of compensation, but it 
cannot justify either the assumption of validity and infringement or the 
assumption that the patent would be included in the standard, both of 
which would constitute unprincipled and ad hoc exceptions. 
In contrast, in our analysis the assumption that the patent is included 
in the SEP flows directly from the basic proposition that the parties are 
assumed to negotiate with knowledge of all ex post information. Exactly 
as with the assumption of validity and infringement, it reflects one 
general principle: that the damages should reflect the value of the 
invention. That same principle justifies using all information about the 
value of the invention. 
Now consider another complication. When a standard is established, 
the competition is often not between one patented technology and one 
public domain technology, but between multiple technologies protected 
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by different patents.95 On a pure ex ante perspective, the parties do not 
know which particular patent will be incorporated into the standard.96 If 
the parties truly negotiated ex ante, the user would seek a license to all 
the possible contenders, all on a discounted rate. The aggregate royalties 
paid by the user would be equal to the expected value of the standard, but 
the royalty paid to any particular patentee would be the discounted rate 
reflecting the probability of its adoption. But in fact, the parties do not 
enter into such widespread speculative licensing ex ante. Moreover, after 
the standard is adopted, the parties will only litigate the selected patent 
because the user will not infringe the patents that were not included in the 
standard. Under the pure ex ante approach, however, the royalty awarded 
would be calculated on the basis of the discounted rate, with the result 
that users pay much less in aggregate royalties than they would have paid 
in the but-for world of the hypothetical negotiation. This follows because 
damages will be assessed only with respect to the one patent that was 
actually selected, rather than all the patents that potentially could have 
been selected and thus would have been subject to (discounted) licenses 
in the but-for world. In this regard, the pure ex ante approach constitutes 
a windfall to the infringing user.97 
On the other hand, sometimes the contingent ex ante approach will 
result in a lower royalty than would have been awarded under the pure ex 
ante approach. For example, in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 98 Judge 
Holderman used a royalty base calculated on the basis of an average chip 
price of $14.85—rather than a weighted average of $3.99, which would 
have given more weight to lower chip prices in the period just prior to the 
standard being established—on the ground that “the hypothetical 
negotiation must take place in the ex ante world . . . without taking into 
account the success of the standard.” 99 Under the contingent ex ante 
approach, however, the parties are assumed to know all relevant 
                                                                                                                     
 95. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 19, at 26. 
 96. See id. at 29.  
 97. Note that if “Shapley value” pricing is used, all patented technologies that might 
plausibly have been incorporated into the standard will be entitled to a royalty proportionate to 
their potential contribution, whether or not the technology actually becomes part of the standard. 
See Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: 
Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 693–700 (2007). This 
corresponds roughly to assessing the royalty as being the patent owner’s ex ante expected revenue 
(though the Shapley calculation is not exactly the same). In our companion paper, we propose that 
an ideal framework for calculating FRAND royalties would apply a variation we refer to as “ex 
post Shapley pricing” to ensure that the royalty for any given SEP is proportionate to its 
contribution to the standard. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 19, at 37–41.  
 98. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11-C-9308, 2013 WL 5593609 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 99. Id. at *39–41. 
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information available at trial, including the fact that chip prices would 
have continued to drop.100 Using ex post information in Innovatio would 
have resulted in a lower royalty rate.  
We do not purport to address all the difficult questions that arise in 
assessing a reasonable royalty in the SEP context in this Article. For 
example, the complementary nature of patents incorporated in a standard 
makes assessing the value of any individual SEPs a difficult 
undertaking.101 This makes it all the more important that the court asks 
the right question, and our point is that the contingent ex ante framework 
provides a simpler, more coherent approach to estimating patent value 
than does the pure approach.  
More generally, the court’s task is to determine the ex ante value of, 
say, Patent A contingent on Patent A’s incorporation into Standard X, 
with the awareness that as part of Standard X, Patent A may derive some 
of its value from its complementarity with other patents in the standard.102 
Importantly, however, this value is distinct from the ex post value of 
owning an SEP that is difficult or impossible to design around. The 
contingent ex ante approach therefore attempts to measure that portion of 
patent value that derives from the patent’s incorporation into a standard—
a fact that can be estimated with greater accuracy post-adoption103—but 
without enabling the patent owner to extract ex post rents that are 
unrelated to that value.  
B.  Unexpected Exogenous Events 
A case that starkly illustrates the distinction between the pure and 
contingent ex ante approaches is Honeywell International, Inc. v. 
Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.104 Honeywell, the owner of a patent on a 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Id. at *41.  
 101. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 
931, 953 (2013). 
 102. Determining what this value is may require the use of proxies, such as appropriate 
comparable licenses. Nevertheless, it is helpful to recognize what the ideal inquiry would entail 
to evaluate whether a suggested proxy is more or less consistent with that ideal. For a more 
complete discussion of our recommended approach to calculating FRAND royalties, with a 
critique of competing approaches, see Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 19.  
 103. The contingent ex ante approach attempts to construct the bargain the parties would 
have reached ex ante with full knowledge of all relevant information revealed ex post, including 
the value of the patent in suit over the next-best available noninfringing alternative. A court can 
only estimate the value of the latter. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. If the technology 
actually chosen turns out to be much more (or less) successful than anticipated, it would be 
necessary to disentangle the degree of success attributable to unanticipated benefits of 
standardization, which the alternative would presumably have realized, and how much is due to 
unanticipated benefits of the selection technology, which would not. In any event, the same or 
analogous difficulties arise under the pure ex ante and pure ex post approaches as well. 
 104. 378 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Del. 2005).  
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control system used in gas turbine engines, accused the defendant, a 
direct competitor, of infringing the patent in auxiliary power units 
(APUs) it supplied under a contract with Embraer, an aircraft 
manufacturer. 105  Demand for large regional aircraft increased 
substantially following the events of 9/11, as a result of which the 
defendant expected its sales of APUs to increase. The court allowed the 
plaintiff to use the defendant’s 2004–2005 sales projections as a royalty 
base, even though those projections anticipated a much larger volume of 
sales than what the defendant would have expected when it began 
infringing in 2000.106 The court justified the introduction of this evidence 
under the book of wisdom.107 As we have seen, however, one view of the 
book of wisdom is that it enables the use of ex post events only as 
evidence of the parties’ ex ante expectations and not—as was the case in 
Honeywell—to contradict them.108 Not surprisingly, advocates of the 
more restrained understanding of the book of wisdom have criticized this 
case.109 In our view, however, Honeywell reflects a sound application of 
the contingent ex ante approach and is correct in its result. Under the 
contingent approach, the hypothetical ex ante negotiation should be based 
on more accurate (ex post) information about the value of the invention, 
so that the resulting damages award is more closely correlated with the 
actual value of the invention. 
Two possible objections to our argument are unpersuasive. The first 
is that, because inventors cannot foresee truly unexpected events, 
damages awards reflecting such events can have no effect on, and 
therefore are unnecessary to preserve, the incentive to invent. The 
observation that one cannot foresee the unforeseeable is, of course, a 
tautology. But even if we concede that some events are unforeseeable, 
standing alone the observation suggests only that application of the 
contingent rule in such cases is unnecessary, not necessarily that it is bad 
policy. More importantly, foreseeability itself is hardly an all-or-nothing 
proposition. Although a rule that correlates awards with actual rather than 
anticipated value sometimes may benefit the lucky, it also will benefit the 
prescient—inventors who are able to foresee changes that others do not. 
(For all we know, perhaps the patentee in Honeywell accurately foresaw 
an increased demand for regional jets as a result of global instability, even 
if it could not have anticipated 9/11 specifically.) Whether or not a 
particular inventor accurately foresaw a particular contingency, the 
contingent rule provides a strong incentive for inventors to make accurate 
predictions of the future state of the world. In this sense, it is more 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Id. at 462–63. 
 106. See id. at 463, 466. 
 107. See id. at 465. 
 108. See Gooding, supra note 24. 
 109. See id. 
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consistent with the justification for the patent system in comparison with 
other means of promoting innovation, namely that patents provide high-
powered incentives for private parties to make their best assessment of 
where future value will lie. The view that the patentee should not be 
rewarded correspondingly if a court subsequently determines that the 
patentee would not have foreseen a particular development dilutes the 
patent incentive by making it turn on an error prone judicial assessment 
of what the patentee would have foreseen, rather than rewarding the 
patentee for its actual results.  
A second objection is that in cases in which the inventor was not 
prescient but merely lucky, the contingent approach is undesirable 
because it renders the inventor better off than she would have been but 
for the infringement. This objection too is unsound, for several reasons. 
First, as we have argued above, the fundamental purpose of patent 
remedies should be to preserve the patent incentive; restoring the status 
quo often may be a means to that end, but it is not an end in and of itself. 
If, then, we are correct in arguing that the contingent approach generally 
does a better job of preserving incentives by rewarding prescience, the 
fact that non-prescient inventors will sometimes be rendered better off in 
comparison with the status quo is not by itself a reason to reject that 
approach. Second, to the extent an exogenous event really was 
unanticipated, someone—either the patent owner or the infringer—winds 
up enjoying an unanticipated benefit, whether one applies the contingent 
or the pure approach. The identity of the party who receives that benefit 
can have no impact on ex ante incentives, however, if the event at issue 
truly was unforeseeable. If the patentee receives a windfall under the 
contingent ex ante approach, this is no more objectionable than if the 
infringer receives a windfall under the pure ex ante approach. The choice 
between the two approaches therefore should rest on the basis of other 
criteria. Third, as we hope we have made clear by now, there is no reason 
to assume that the contingent approach always favors patent owners. One 
could easily imagine a variation on the facts of Honeywell in which the 
demand for regional aircraft decreased after some unforeseen event so 
that ex post the infringer, rather than the patent owner, would prefer 
application of the contingent rule. This should dispose of any concern that 
basing the award on ex post information necessarily increases deadweight 
loss.110 
C.  Separate and Distinct Infringements 
Infringement of a patent may take place over an extended period of 
time, sometimes under substantially changed circumstances that affect 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 32, at 801 (arguing that reliance on ex ante 
information may drastically over- or under-compensate the patentee). 
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the value of the invention. The basic difference between the contingent 
and pure ex ante approaches is that under the former, but not the latter, 
these new circumstances will be taken into account in assessing the 
reasonable royalty. But sometimes the circumstances are so different that 
the infringements are taken to be separate and distinct, in which case there 
will be two separate hypothetical negotiations, even under the pure ex 
ante approach, and the second negotiation can use information that is ex 
post with respect to the first infringement. The puzzle for the pure ex ante 
approach is to explain exactly when the infringements are separate and 
distinct so that “ex post” information can be taken into account. In this 
Section, we argue that the pure ex ante approach has no satisfactory 
solution to this puzzle, while the contingent ex ante approach provides a 
straightforward principled analysis of this scenario. 
Applied Medical Resources Corp. v U.S. Surgical Corp. (Applied 
II),111 the leading case on point, illustrates this problem. Applied Medical 
held a patent on a surgical instrument.112 In Applied I, it successfully sued 
U.S. Surgical on the basis that U.S. Surgical’s Versaport instrument 
(Versaport I) infringed the patent. 113 Applied Medical was “awarded 
damages in the form of a 7% reasonable royalty.” 114  U.S. Surgical 
redesigned its Versaport instrument and began selling the redesigned 
instrument (Versaport II) shortly after the verdict in Applied I.115 Applied 
Medical sued again on the basis of the same patent.116 At trial in Applied 
II, the court found that the redesigned instrument infringed Applied’s 
patent.117 U.S. Surgical, the infringer, sought to argue that the same 7% 
royalty that had been determined in Applied I should also be used in 
Applied II. 118  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, saying 
“reasonable royalty damages are not calculated in a vacuum without 
consideration of the infringement being redressed. We are required to 
identify the infringement requiring compensation, and evaluate damages 
based on a hypothetical negotiation at the time that infringement began, 
not an earlier one.”119 In our view the Federal Circuit was correct to hold 
that the royalties might be different, and the question is how to best 
explain this result.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 111. 435 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 112. Id. at 1358. 
 113. See id.  
 114. Id.   
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 1359.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 1361. 
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The pure ex ante approach can provide what appears at first glance to 
be a straightforward explanation of this holding: if there are two separate 
infringements, then information that was ex post in the first may be ex 
ante in the second, and so available to the hypothetical negotiators. 
The difficulty for the pure ex ante approach is in explaining when 
infringements should be considered to be separate. One point the court 
noted in holding that the infringements were distinct is that the sales of 
the Versaport I and II began at “separate and distinct times.”120 But this 
cannot be a determinative factor. In the first place, the infringement was 
continuous in time, so the putatively separate timing of the infringement 
expressly did not turn on any temporal break in the infringement.121 
Conversely, even if there were a temporal break in the infringement, this 
presumably would not suffice on its own to establish two distinct 
infringements; if the infringer had temporarily stopped shipping the 
Versaport I, perhaps because of the bankruptcy of a parts supplier or a 
fire at its plant and then resumed selling exactly the same instrument, it 
is difficult to see how this could constitute separate and distinct 
infringements. The reasonable royalty should not depend on events that 
are unrelated to the infringement. And clearly the separate timing of the 
sales cannot depend on the name of the infringing product; a simple 
rebranding of the infringing device would not suffice to make subsequent 
sales of the rebranded product a separate infringement.  
A more promising approach is to focus on the redesigned product 
itself. The Federal Circuit pointed out that by U.S. Surgical’s own 
admission, the redesigned instrument was substantially improved and 
different from the original instrument, even though both incorporated the 
patented invention.122 Again, however, it is difficult to see how this could 
be determinative. Suppose exactly the same instrument were sold but 
after a hiatus of several years, during which market conditions had 
changed substantially. Should we say there was only one infringement 
because the product itself was the same? Conversely, if many small 
improvements were gradually made to the original instrument over a 
period of continuous sales, it would be difficult to say when the distinct 
infringement began, even if the initial product and the final product were 
very different. 
It might be suggested that the question should turn on whether the 
second infringement would have been in contempt of an injunction 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Id. at 1361–62. 
 121. See id. at 1362 (“That the infringement activity caused by Versaport I and Versaport II 
may appear to be continuous in time does not mean that it is a continuous infringement in law.”). 
 122. See id.  
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against the first infringement. 123  But what if there was no initial 
injunction? In Applied I and Applied II the distinct infringements were 
the subject of distinct actions, but this will by no means always be true; 
it must be quite common for a patentee to bring one action in respect of 
both putatively distinct infringements. 124  It would be intolerable to 
address this by suggesting that the reasonable royalty should turn on the 
hypothetical terms of an injunction, which a court would have issued had 
there been separate litigation. Moreover, this test would make the 
question of separate infringements, and hence the reasonable royalty, 
depend on the exact terms of the previous injunction, even though 
injunctive relief is by no means uniform in its scope. The reasonable 
royalty should not depend on the precise terms of a discretionary grant of 
injunctive relief. 
There is a more fundamental problem with looking to the changes in 
the infringing product. The obvious policy justification for considering 
distinct products to constitute distinct infringements is that changes to the 
product might affect the royalty, and the hypothetical negotiation should 
take this into account: if the redesigned instrument sold at a higher price 
because of new noninfringing features, it could not be presumed that the 
royalty on the new instrument and the old instrument would be the same. 
But if the infringements are considered to be distinct, all new information 
may be taken into account in the second hypothetical negotiation, not just 
new information about the redesigned product. If the market conditions 
have changed so that the reasonable royalty would have changed even if 
the product had remained entirely the same, the new hypothetical 
negotiation will take that into account, even though it is unconnected with 
the redesigned product. The resultant change in the reasonable royalty 
might be substantially greater than the change justified by the redesign 
alone; indeed, while the changed product alone might justify a higher 
royalty, the royalty might actually go down because of the changed 
circumstances, or vice versa. The mechanism of allowing a new 
negotiation is overbroad if the rationale is to take account of changes to 
the product itself.  
Of course, we might also say that whether there are discrete 
infringements should be assessed in light of the totality of the 
circumstances. This is probably most consistent with Applied II. 
However, a totality of the circumstances test highlights the arbitrary and 
formalistic nature of the separate infringements analysis. Suppose the 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See id. (“To argue otherwise, U.S. Surgical would have to concede that it has willfully 
violated the permanent injunction in Applied I.”). 
 124. Id. at 1362–63. Clearly, the question of whether there are two infringements cannot 
depend on whether two separate actions are brought, and there is nothing in Applied II to suggest 
otherwise. 
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invention is a pharmaceutical, and the user carries out a single small-scale 
experiment that infringes, and then two years later goes into large-scale 
production.125 The information regarding the value of the invention may 
have changed dramatically in the interim. Should the hypothetical 
negotiation be assumed to take place at the time of the experiment126 or 
at the time of large-scale production? If this turns on whether the 
infringements are separate, the answer presumably would depend on the 
relationship between the experiment and the production. If the 
experiment is directly aimed at and leads to the commercial product, then 
presumably it would be part of the same infringement. What if the 
experiment was aimed at commercial production, but the user had 
forgotten it by the time of the later commercial production, and all the 
experiments were redone at that later time? What if the experiment has 
two purposes: to see if the user can manufacture it, and to see if it had 
promise for the treatment of disease A? What if the subsequent 
commercial use is to treat disease B, but the user uses the manufacturing 
knowledge? Hypotheticals can be multiplied, but the point is that the 
damages award should not turn on these kinds of distinctions.  
Under the pure ex ante approach, therefore, the award may vary 
greatly depending on whether courts consider two somewhat related 
infringing acts as truly separate and distinct. No doubt there are some 
cases where it is intuitively obvious that the infringing acts are separate 
and many where it seems clear that there is a single continuous act, but at 
the margins, many millions of dollars may turn on what is a purely 
formalistic distinction. 
Another problem with the pure ex ante approach is that separate 
hypothetical negotiations may allow the patentee to extract royalties from 
the infringer that reflect holdup value rather than the value of the 
invention. Suppose that the infringer invests substantial sunk costs in 
reliance on the patented technology, such as investment in a specialized 
plant or personnel training, perhaps because the infringer independently 
invented the technology without awareness of the prior patent. Suppose 
further that, after the initial launch, the infringer subsequently develops a 
substantially redesigned new product incorporating the same patented 
technology, as in Applied II, and the new product relies on the same plant 
and personnel costs as the original product. The ex ante nature of the 
hypothetical negotiation means that the royalty assessed for the first 
                                                                                                                     
 125. See infra Section II.D (discussing Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 
860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 126. This scenario assumes that the experiment is not permissible under the experimental use 
defense. Note that in Integra, the Federal Circuit concluded that the experiment was not 
permissible, but the Supreme Court vacated the ruling on this point. See Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. 
at 208. 
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infringement will not reflect any holdup value, but because the infringer 
has already incurred the sunk costs at the time of the second hypothetical 
negotiation, the royalty emerging from that negotiation will reflect 
holdup value.127 The concepts of separate and distinct infringements may 
actually defeat the purpose of the ex ante approach. 
None of these problems arise under the contingent ex ante approach. 
As discussed at the outset, under the contingent approach, the 
hypothetical negotiation takes place before any sunk costs are incurred 
(which implies, as a general matter, just one hypothetical negotiation per 
infringement action, though this is nothing more than a matter of 
convenience). Nevertheless, the court also will take into account any 
relevant new information concerning the product, the market, or anything 
else that emerges after the time of the initial infringement, on the ground 
that any resultant change in value should be reflected in the damages 
awarded. Consequently, the formal question of whether infringements are 
separate and distinct will not affect the royalty. 
D.  Regulatory Uncertainty 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.128 is an important modern case holding that 
only ex ante information should be used in assessing a reasonable 
royalty.129 Integra specifically concerned regulatory uncertainty regarding 
FDA approval, which was required to market the invention in question.130 
We argue that the holding in Integra was wrong on this point, for two 
reasons. The first is that regulatory uncertainty should be treated exactly as 
any other source of uncertainty—which is to say that, under the contingent 
ex ante approach, courts should use ex post information (whether the drug 
was in fact approved) because it provides a better assessment of the true 
value of the invention. In this Section, we will show that if only ex ante 
information can be used in the hypothetical negotiation, an infringer’s 
subjective and incorrect assessment of the value of the invention can 
dramatically affect the value of the royalty, even if the patentee’s 
assessment of the value is correct ex ante. Secondly, the court in Integra 
runs together two different considerations, namely risk shifting and 
uncertainty, which should be kept distinct. 131  Even if risk-shifting 
considerations would weigh in favor of using only ex ante information (this 
is addressed in detail below), that would not justify using only ex ante 
information if doing so would grossly misvalue the invention itself. This is 
a general consideration, which is a recurrent refrain in our analysis. 
                                                                                                                     
 127. Note that this problem apparently did not arise on the facts of Applied II. 
 128. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 129. See id. at 869. 
 130. Id. at 863, 865. 
 131. See id. at 869–70.  
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Integra and others owned patents relating to a compound that 
promotes cell adhesion, referred to as the “RGD peptide.” 132 Integra 
alleged that Scripps Research Institute infringed these patents by 
conducting experiments funded by Merck to uncover potential drug 
candidates derived from EMD 66203, an RGD polypeptide. 133  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment that the defendants’ conduct 
infringed Integra’s patents—a finding the Supreme Court later vacated 
based on its interpretation of the statutory experimental use defense134—
but reversed the damages award of $15 million.135 The court’s discussion 
of damages focused on the importance of determining when the 
infringement began and the information that would have informed a 
hypothetical negotiation taking place as of the correct date: 
The first step in a reasonable royalty calculation is to 
ascertain the date on which the hypothetical negotiation in 
advance of infringement would have occurred. The correct 
determination of this date is essential for properly assessing 
damages. The value of a hypothetical license negotiated in 
1994 could be drastically different from one undertaken in 
1995 due to the more nascent state of the RGD peptide 
research in 1994. Indeed, factoring in the rapid development 
of biotechnological arts, a year can make a great difference 
in economic risks and rewards. 
. . . . 
[An expert witness for the plaintiffs] proffered a 
hypothetical license figure based, in part, on Merck’s 1995 
expectations of obtaining FDA approval of a cyclic peptide 
therapeutic. As already noted, however, if the hypothetical 
negotiation occurred in 1994, Merck did not have that 
expectation. Thus, an earlier date will change the risks and 
expectations of the parties. 
. . . . 
At the point before Merck ever attempted its first test on 
RGD technology, it would have assumed all the risks of 
failure—either scientific failure to identify a suitable 
therapeutic candidate or economic failure to market a 
                                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 862. 
 133. See id. at 863. 
 134. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–08 (2005). 
 135. See Integra, 331 F.3d at 869–72. 
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss4/1
2016] DETERMINING REASONABLE ROYALTIES IN PATENT LITIGATION 973 
 
successful product. If those risks as perceived before any 
experimentation differed from the risks quantified in the 
[1995] ImClone agreement, then the ImClone example does 
little to set the value of the pre-clinical RGD research project 
at a comparable figure. The parties’ inability to project 
success at the pre-clinical research stage of the RGD project 
weighs heavily in determining a reasonable royalty, 
particularly if the time for the valuation of the project moves 
back to 1994.136 
The Integra court’s discussion conflates two distinct issues: risk shifting 
and errors in the parties’ expected value. To clarify the distinction between 
these issues, consider the following hypothetical facts loosely based on 
Integra.137 Suppose, as in Integra, that the patentee has developed a drug 
candidate and that the defendant is a major drug company that in 1994 
begins using the drug in ways that are possibly infringing. At the time of 
this use, there are two sources of uncertainty. One is technical uncertainty 
over the range of potential medical uses, which would affect the market for 
the drug. In particular, assume there is a one-third chance that the drug will 
be a complete failure; a one-third chance it has the potential to treat disease 
A, in which case it will be worth $2 billion; and a one-third chance it can 
also treat disease B, in which case it will be worth $4 billion. The expected 
value of the market is therefore $2 billion. In addition, there is regulatory 
uncertainty due to potential toxicity concerns, resulting in a 50% chance 
the FDA will approve the drug and a 50% chance the FDA will not 
approve it. Discounting the value of the market by the regulatory 
uncertainty, the expected value in 1994 is $1 billion, which is available for 
the parties to split. For simplicity, assume that the patentee’s minimum 
willingness to accept is zero—perhaps because there are no other potential 
partners with the specialized expertise necessary to take the drug through 
clinical trials—while the licensee’s maximum willingness to pay is equal 
to the full expected value of the invention. Assume also that the parties 
have equal bargaining power, and they will split the available surplus 
equally on a Nash bargaining model.138 If they are both risk neutral, this 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Id. at 870–71. 
 137. In the actual case, there were several potential therapeutic uses of the allegedly 
infringing polypeptide, a voluntary licensing agreement between a research institute and a major 
drug company, and a third-party patent owner who claimed that both of the parties to the license 
infringed. See id. at 863, 870, 874. For illustrative purposes, this hypothetical simplifies matters 
and assumes the probabilities of certain outcomes. 
 138. See generally John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 J. ECONOMETRIC SOC. 155 
(1950) (introducing the “Nash bargaining model”). We acknowledge that the Nash model, like 
the 25% rule of thumb before it, has drawn criticism from the courts for not being sufficiently tied 
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implies a royalty of $500 million if the parties had actually bargained in 
1994. If one of the parties is risk averse, then the royalty would shift 
accordingly. To put a number on it, suppose the patentee is risk averse 
and the drug company is not, and at this level of risk, the royalty reflecting 
risk shifting would be $400 million. 
Now suppose that the defendant performs clearly infringing acts in 
1995. We can further break down this hypothetical into two competing 
scenarios. In Scenario 1, suppose that by 1995 the medical uncertainty 
has been resolved—it is known that the drug will treat disease A but not 
disease B—but the regulatory uncertainty remains. The expected value 
of the market in 1995 will still be $2 billion, as it was in 1994, but the 
uncertainty as to that value has been reduced. After discounting for 
regulatory risk, the expected value of the invention remains $1 billion, 
though with a lower risk than in 1994. If the parties are both risk neutral, 
we would expect them to split this expected value 50/50. If the patentee 
is risk averse, however, the reduction in uncertainty will have shifted 
bargaining positions in favor of the patentee, who will take a somewhat 
larger share than it would have taken in 1994, when there was more 
uncertainty. The risk is still not zero, so the terms will still favor the risk-
neutral party, although not by as much as in 1994. To put a number on it, 
suppose that with the uncertainty partially resolved, the risk-averse 
patentee would receive a royalty of $450 million if the parties had 
negotiated in 1995. 
In Scenario 2, further experiments by 1995 have resolved the 
regulatory uncertainty, so that it is clear that toxicity concerns will not 
block the drug, but the medical indications are still not established. The 
value of the market remains the same, but with the regulatory uncertainty 
resolved, the expected value is now $2 billion. The risk also has been 
reduced, by roughly the same amount as in the first scenario. If the parties 
are risk neutral, this implies a royalty of $1 billion; if the patentee is risk 
averse, the split will shift roughly 10% in favor of the patentee, implying 
a royalty of $900 million if the parties had actually bargained in 1995. 
All or most of the difference between the royalties in the two scenarios 
reflects the correction of the parties’ earlier expectations in light of new 
information; little or none of it reflects a risk-shifting premium. Indeed, if 
both parties are risk neutral (which is entirely plausible) there will be no 
risk-shifting premium at all. The royalty in the first scenario (medical 
uncertainty resolved) will be $500 million, and in the second (regulatory 
uncertainty resolved), it will be $1 billion. Thus, despite the absence of a 
risk-shifting premium, there will still be a $500 million difference in the 
                                                                                                                     
to the facts of the particular case. Nothing in our example turns on the particular split between the 
parties, and we chose a 50/50 split purely for simplicity of arithmetic. The same analysis would 
follow from any particular split that a court might find appropriate on the facts of a particular case.  
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royalty. This illustrates that risk shifting and resolving uncertainty are 
fundamentally different considerations.  
In our view, in the reasonable royalty calculation, both of these 
factors—risk shifting and updated information—are best dealt with using 
ex post information. First consider the updated information. To focus on 
updated information, assume the parties are both risk neutral, so risk 
shifting will have no effect. Under the contingent ex ante approach, the 
parties are assumed to have all of the information available at the time of 
trial. We can combine the two scenarios and assume that at the time of 
trial the regulatory uncertainty has been resolved by approval of the 
product (as it normally would be for the infringer to infringe on a 
commercial scale), and it is known that the drug will treat condition A 
but not condition B, so that the market value is known to be $2 billion. 
Under the contingent ex ante approach the parties are assumed to know 
this, and they will therefore agree to a $1 billion royalty; that is, the 
patentee will receive 50% of the actual value of the invention. This result 
will follow regardless of whether the 1994 experiment was infringing and 
regardless of whether the regulatory or medical uncertainty is resolved at 
the time of the first infringement.139 
In contrast, under the pure ex ante approach, as stated in Integra,140 
the reasonable royalty will depend on whether the 1994 experiments were 
infringing. If they were, the damages will be $500 million; if they were 
not, damages will be $500 million under Scenario 1 and $1 billion under 
Scenario 2. Depending on the exact state of the parties’ knowledge at the 
time of the first infringement, the patentee may receive substantially less 
than its intended share of the actual value of the invention. Indeed, if by 
the time of trial the FDA has approved the drug for both conditions A and 
B, its true value will be $4 billion and the reasonable royalty $2 billion 
under the contingent ex ante approach; but the award on the pure ex ante 
approach will still be only $500 million if the infringement took place in 
1994. This illustrates our basic critique of the pure ex ante approach: why 
should the royalty depend on the mistaken nature of the parties’ belief? 
If those beliefs are systematically mistaken, then the patent incentive will 
be systematically wrong too. 
                                                                                                                     
 139. To state the matter another way, there is no reason to treat regulatory or medical 
uncertainty differently from any other type of uncertainty. Indeed, in the present example, one 
could characterize both forms of uncertainty as going to the pharmacological properties of the 
drug—is it toxic? Does it treat disease B?—and it is only happenstance that the former but not the 
latter is subject to regulatory approval. In fact, the latter is subject to regulatory approval—a firm 
cannot (formally) market the drug for an unauthorized indication—but in practice that does not 
really matter because if the drug does not actually work for the unauthorized indication, then no 
one will buy it, and if it does actually work, then it will often be prescribed off-label. So there is 
no firm distinction between regulatory approval and other uncertainty, and no reason to draw one. 
 140. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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The district court explicitly made this point in Honeywell, in which 
the question was whether sales projections that were unavailable at the 
time infringement began could be used as a royalty base in assessing 
damages.141 The court held they could, expressly rejecting Integra on the 
basis, inter alia, that using the ex post information “protects the quid pro 
quo underlying patent law by preventing a premature valuation of the 
patent.”142 This Article’s analysis implies that the court in Honeywell was 
exactly right. We acknowledge that Integra stands as authority against 
the contingent ex ante approach, but we note that its authority on this 
particular point is weakened because the Supreme Court’s reversal on the 
experimental use defense mooted the court’s order remanding the case 
for the recalculation of damages. 143  Moreover, the district court in 
Honeywell held that it could avoid Integra’s authority because it was 
inconsistent with other appellate authority that supported the use of ex 
post information, and as between two decisions of equal authority, a 
lower court should follow that which is better reasoned.144 We agree on 
both points.  
The merit of the Honeywell court’s position is even clearer if the 
parties have differing expectations, which is often likely to be the case. 
In the example above we assumed that the parties agreed on the expected 
value both in 1994 and in 1995. Suppose instead that in 1994 the patentee, 
on the basis of its own experiments, is very confident that the toxicity 
problem is not serious and that the FDA will approve the drug. It 
estimates the regulatory risk at essentially zero, and so places a $2 billion 
expected value on the invention. The prospective licensee, on the other 
hand, does not trust the patentee’s information and in good faith estimates 
the regulatory risk at 50%. Consequently, the licensee places an expected 
value of only $1 billion on the invention. If, as above, the hypothetical 
negotiation takes place in 1994, the parties have equal bargaining power, 
and the patentee’s minimum willingness to accept is still zero, the 
licensee’s maximum willingness to pay is only $1 billion. A 50/50 split 
will result in a royalty of $500 million, as in the original example. Now 
assume, as before, that the FDA later approves the drug for indication A. In 
this case, if the 1994 experiment is infringing, under the pure ex ante 
approach, the patentee will receive a royalty that grossly undervalues the 
actual value of the invention, for the sole reason that the licensee was wrong 
about the expected value, even though the patentee was entirely right.  
                                                                                                                     
 141. 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463 (D. Del. 2005). 
 142. Id. at 469. 
 143. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).  
 144. Honeywell, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (citing Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply 
Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988), which in turn quotes extensively from Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698–99 (1933)). 
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This example highlights the fundamental flaw with the pure ex ante 
approach. The disadvantage of the patent system as compared with 
government grants or prizes as a means of encouraging innovation is that 
the patent system requires above-marginal-cost pricing, which 
inefficiently restricts dissemination. The compensating advantage of the 
patent system is that it gives the inventor a high-powered incentive to 
accurately estimate the value of the invention. It is wrong that an inventor, 
who in fact accurately assesses the value of the invention should 
nonetheless be denied a commensurate reward because of errors made by 
the infringer. The best defense of the pure ex ante approach from an 
incentive perspective is that the ex ante expected value of the invention 
is likely to be accurate on average. We have argued above that it is 
unrealistic to expect ex ante expectations to be generally accurate, even 
if the parties share the same expectations. 145 When the parties have 
divergent expectations, they cannot both be right, so the reasonable 
royalty payable under the pure ex ante approach must be wrong because 
it depends on the expectation of both parties. Moreover, negotiations are 
likely to break down precisely when the expectations of the parties are 
different. If no actual license is entered into because the patentee correctly 
assigns a higher value to the invention than does the potential licensee, to 
hold the patentee to a reasonable royalty that reflects the infringer’s 
mistaken expectation effectively allows the infringer to insist that the 
patentee accept a deal based on the infringer’s mistaken negotiating 
position.  
As noted above, the courts routinely acknowledge the artificiality of 
imagining “what warring parties would have agreed to as willing 
negotiators.”146 It is not only artificial but wrong in principle to posit a 
willing negotiation that splits the parties’ expected value attributable to 
the invention when the parties were unwilling to negotiate precisely 
because they did not agree on that value. On the contingent ex ante 
approach, in contrast, we can assume that the parties agree on the value 
of the invention in the hypothetical negotiation, even though they did not 
in the actual negotiation, because the value that they are taken to agree 
on is the true value of the invention. 
Now briefly consider the risk-shifting aspect, which we will return to 
in more detail in a subsequent section.147 Risk shifting is illustrated by 
the scenario in which the medical uncertainty is resolved but the 
regulatory uncertainty is not, so that the expected value of the invention 
remains unchanged but the risk is reduced. If one of the parties is risk 
averse, this will result in a shift in the royalty that the parties would 
negotiate, by $50 million in our example. In effect, if the negotiation had 
                                                                                                                     
 145. See discussion supra Section II.D.  
 146. See Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1575; cases cited supra note 52.  
 147. See infra Subsection II.E.1.  
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taken place in 1994, the patentee would have been willing to pay the 
licensee $50 million to bear the risk.  
There are two problems with using a hypothetical negotiation based 
only on ex ante information to replicate this risk-shifting function. The 
first, discussed in more detail below, is that the award of damages should 
not reflect the risk that a party would have agreed to bear at the time, 
unless that party actually bore that risk in fact; and whether the party bore 
the risk in fact turns on ex post information.  
The second problem is to insist that courts use only ex ante 
information to replicate the risk bearing function is the proverbial “tail 
wagging the dog.”148 As we have seen, using only ex ante information 
affects the license in two distinct ways: the parties’ ex ante errors as to 
the true value of the invention will affect the royalty; and there will be 
greater overall risk, which affects the royalty if (but only if) the parties 
are differentially risk averse. These effects are independent, and the risk-
shifting effect may be very small compared to the effect of erroneous 
information. If the parties are risk neutral, then there will be no risk-
shifting effect at all. If we accept that using only ex ante information 
would undesirably distort the patent incentive, then it would be wrong to 
insist that courts nonetheless exclude the ex post information simply to 
replicate the risk-shifting effect. In our original example, of the difference 
of $550 million in the royalty between the pure and contingent 
approaches, only $50 million is due to risk shifting, and $500 million is 
due to new information about the true value of the invention. If we accept 
that the patentee should receive the extra $500 million to preserve the 
patent incentive, it would be wrong to throw this away by insisting on the 
pure ex ante approach simply to reflect the $50 million risk-shifting 
premium. 
E.  Lump-Sum Versus Running Royalties 
As noted earlier, if the evidence establishes that the parties would have 
agreed to a running royalty, the pure and contingent ex ante approaches 
often will lead to the same result because ex post information regarding 
sales volume is used under either approach.149 Conversely, situations in 
which the parties in fact would have agreed to a fully paid-in lump-sum 
royalty present a clear contrast between the two approaches. Whether the 
parties use a lump sum or a running royalty,150 they will attempt to split 
                                                                                                                     
 148. See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 32, at 803. 
 149. See supra Sections I.B., I.C. Results under the two approaches may differ, however, if 
there is some other ex post information that would be relevant under the contingent approach, 
such as regulatory change or the identification of a noninfringing alternative.  
 150. The literature often distinguishes between per unit running royalties, in which the 
royalty is expressed in dollars per unit sold, and an ad valorem royalty, which is expressed as a 
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the true incremental value of the invention. In negotiating a lump sum, 
the parties will do their best to estimate the value of the invention to the 
licensee. This will involve some projection of future sales. The pure ex 
ante approach will attempt to recreate that speculation. The contingent 
approach, in contrast, will split the value of the invention based on ex 
post knowledge, which is to say that the parties will be assumed to have 
accurate knowledge of the sales volume or any other factors, which would 
affect the amount of the royalty.151 
Our basic argument, as always, is that the contingent approach is 
generally preferable to the pure approach because it provides a more 
accurate assessment of the true value of the invention; assessing damages 
based on a lump sum royalty cannot be justified merely because that is 
what the parties would have done. With that said, we nevertheless should 
ask why the parties would have negotiated a lump sum payment, to see 
whether any of the specific functional reasons why the parties would have 
used a lump sum royalty would justify the courts in assessing damages 
without using ex post evidence, notwithstanding the consequent 
distortion of the patent incentive. As discussed below, the economic 
literature on licensing suggests a variety of factors that may affect the 
parties’ decision as to how to structure their royalty payments. These 
include: (1) risk shifting; (2) avoiding double marginalization (and, more 
generally, strategic considerations in the downstream market); (3) 
reducing borrowing costs; and (4) administrative (monitoring) costs.152 
In general, any of these considerations may factor into any particular 
decision as to royalty structure. The parties may also balance these 
considerations by using a blend of lump sum and running royalty. It is 
nonetheless convenient to address each of these factors individually.  
To cut to the chase, we will argue that none of these considerations, 
either individually or collectively, justifies ignoring ex post information 
for two basic reasons. First is what we referred to above as the problem 
of the tail wagging the dog. 153  For example, if the courts use a 
hypothetical negotiation based only on ex ante information to replicate 
the risk-shifting effect of a lump-sum royalty,  this would entail distorting 
the patent incentive by ignoring information about the true value of the 
invention, even though the risk-shifting effect might be very small, as 
                                                                                                                     
percentage of the sale price of the final product. See, e.g., Stefano Colombo & Luigi Filippini, 
Revenue Royalties, J. ECON., Oct. 2015, at 1, 2. This distinction is not necessary for our analysis, 
and in referring to a running royalty, we mean to include both types of royalty. 
 151. Suppose, for example, that the parties would have agreed to a 60/40 split in favor of the 
licensee on expected sales revenue of $100,000. The licensee could pay a lump sum of $40,000, 
or a running royalty of 40% of sales revenue. The implicit royalty rate in the lump sum royalty is 
40%, so under the contingent approach, the court would apply a 40% rate against the sales revenue 
actually earned (possibly adjusted, however, for other factors discussed below). 
 152. See infra Subsections II.E.1–II.E.4. 
 153. See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 32, at 803.  
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discussed above. This is a general problem with all of the reasons why 
the parties might choose a lump sum. We will not repeat this point with 
respect to every issue discussed below, but it should be understood to 
apply. 
Secondly, an award of damages based solely on ex ante information 
generally will not have the same functional effect as a license actually 
agreed to ex ante. For example, a lump-sum payment actually made at the 
outset would reduce the patentee’s risk because payment would not be 
contingent on uncertain future sales, while infringement increases the 
patentee’s risk by making payment contingent on extended and uncertain 
litigation. It is not sensible to assess damages on the basis of a lump-sum 
agreement that willing parties would have entered into to decrease the 
patentee’s risk, when the parties’ actual course of conduct had the effect 
of increasing that risk. With that said, the infringer might in fact end up 
bearing some of the risk or performing other valuable services, but the 
services actually performed will not generally be the same as those that 
the parties would have agreed to ex ante. To be fair to both the infringer 
and the patentee, it is necessary to use ex post information to determine 
which services were actually provided. This argument exactly parallels 
the rationale for using ex post information about the value of the 
invention. Rather than determining what the parties would have expected 
the profits to be and then determining what other services each party 
would have expected to have undertaken, we should ask what the value 
of the invention actually was, and what services actually were provided. 
1.  Risk Shifting  
Uncertainty as to the future state of the world, such as future demand 
for the patented product, creates risk. If one of the parties is more risk 
averse than the other, the parties may wish to partially shift that risk by 
structuring the royalty payments appropriately. One way of doing this is 
to choose between a lump sum and a running royalty. As a general matter, 
a running royalty shifts risk (such as demand or cost uncertainties) from 
the licensee to the licensor/patentee and thus might be appropriate when 
the patentee is risk neutral and the licensee is risk averse.154 Conversely, 
if the patentee is risk averse and the licensee is risk neutral, a lump sum 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Alain 
Bousquet et al., Risk Sharing in Licensing, 16 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 535, 542 (1998). This may 
seem counterintuitive because a lump-sum payment provides the licensor with more certainty as 
to its royalty payment. However, the licensee is concerned with risk relating to its overall profits. 
Profitability risk is reduced with a running royalty, because royalty payments are reduced if sales 
are low, and vice versa, thus dampening the effect of uncertainty as to sales. See generally 
Bousquet et al., supra, at 550–51 (discussing the uncertainty of royalty rationales). 
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will place more of the risk on the licensee. 155  
Even if the parties would have used a lump sum to shift risk to the 
licensee, a court should not ignore ex post information in an attempt to 
recreate the lump sum, which the parties would have arrived at had they 
actually bargained, because such an award would not actually shift risk. 
To shift risk, a payment must substitute a certain present sum for an 
uncertain future sum.156 At the time of the first infringement, any court-
awarded damages are also an uncertain future event. Consequently, from 
a risk-shifting perspective, damages awarded ex post cannot substitute for 
a lump sum actually paid ex ante.  
To illustrate, return to our example based on Integra157 and suppose 
that the patentee is a small and risk-averse research firm, while the 
infringer/licensee is a large risk-neutral pharmaceutical company. The 
parties to an actual license might well agree to a lump-sum royalty to shift 
risk to the licensee. In that case, the lump-sum royalty will be smaller 
than the expected value of the equivalent running royalty, with the 
difference being the implicit payment made by the patentee in return for 
the licensee agreeing to bear the risk of the invention’s success. If 
damages replicate that lump sum, the court would be saying that the 
infringer should receive a larger share of the profits from the invention 
because if it had not infringed, it would have paid a lump sum which 
would have reduced the risk to the patentee. But the infringer may not in 
fact have borne any risk. For example, the patentee might actually have 
licensed to a different pharmaceutical company, which carried out the 
clinical trials and developed the market, while the infringer, though it 
carried out early infringing trials, ultimately did not commercialize a 
product until after the market was mature. If the infringer did not in fact 
bear any risk, and the patentee’s royalty is nonetheless reduced as if it 
had, then the infringer will effectively be paid for a service that it never 
provided. Indeed, by taking market share away from the patentee and 
substituting a future uncertain damages award, the infringer would 
actually have increased the patentee’s risk. In such circumstances, to 
assess damages based on a lump sum would reward the infringer as if it 
had decreased the patentee’s risk when in fact the opposite is true.  
One possible response is that even an infringement decreases the risk 
to the patentee if the likelihood of detecting the infringement and 
                                                                                                                     
 155. While it is convenient to discuss risk shifting in the context of the choice between a 
lump sum and a running royalty, risk shifting may also be reflected in the royalty rates. The parties 
might want to use a running royalty for risk-shifting reasons, but the monitoring burden might be 
too high. In that case, the parties might agree to a lump sum royalty that is somewhat lower than 
it would be if both parties were risk neutral; rather than shifting the risk, the licensee would be 
directly compensated for bearing undesirable risk. The analysis in this Section is applicable 
regardless of how the risk shifting is implemented. 
 156. See Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1325–26. 
 157. See discussion supra Section II.D.  
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establishing liability are sufficiently high. In effect, the patentee could 
say to itself, “Excellent, my patent is being infringed, so I know I have a 
guaranteed market for my invention, once I have enforced it.” If that 
guarantee of recovery were sufficiently secure, then the patentee might 
prefer to have damages assessed on the basis of a lump sum with a lower 
expected value because it would recover even in those instances in which 
the realized sales were lower than expected (which is the point that makes 
a lump sum attractive to the patentee). In that case, the infringement 
would actually reduce the patentee’s risk, and so a lower expected award 
based on a lump sum would be justified. But if the probability of 
enforcement was so high ex ante that it effectively reduced the risk faced 
by the patentee as much as a lump-sum payment would have done, then 
surely the infringer would have licensed rather than infringed to save the 
inevitable litigation costs.158 This is just a corollary of the point that a 
future uncertain damages award cannot substitute for a present actual 
payment. 
Another counterargument might be that it is unnecessary to abandon 
the pure ex ante approach to address this problem because risk shifting is 
implicitly reflected in the choice of comparable licenses. If the infringer 
did not in fact bear the risk, then the only licenses which should be 
considered comparable for the purposes of the hypothetical negotiation 
are those in which the actual licensee did not bear the risk. But how do 
we know that comparable licenses are those in which the licensee did not 
bear the risk? The only way we can know this is if we know that the actual 
infringer did not bear the risk, and that is ex post knowledge. This 
response attempts to save the pure ex ante approach but only by 
smuggling in ex post information through the back door. Indeed, this 
response reinforces our point that it is necessary to use ex post 
information to assess the value of the risk shifting that actually occurred.  
While the patentee’s risk cannot be reduced by a lump-sum payment 
that was never actually made, the infringer might nonetheless bear 
substantial risk through other means. In the example above we supposed 
that the research-focused patentee was successful in licensing to a third 
party, and the infringer entered only after the market was mature. But it 
is also entirely possible that the patentee never licensed, and it is the 
infringer that brought the product to market, perhaps unaware that it was 
infringing, and bore substantial risk in so doing. In such a case, the 
infringer should be compensated for the risk it bore. But to reward the 
infringer for risk bearing, there is no need to pretend that the parties 
would have negotiated based only on information available as of the time 
                                                                                                                     
 158. It might be possible to test this empirically by asking whether a patentee faced with a 
putative infringement could borrow money against that potential action at rates comparable with 
the implicit discount it is paying as compared with the return it would earn with a running royalty. 
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infringement started. To do so would risk distorting the patent incentive; 
in our hypothetical variation on the facts of Integra, for example, the pure 
ex ante approach would apply a 10% risk discount to a $500 million 
expected market value, resulting in a $400 million royalty,159 even if the 
invention actually turned out to be worth $2 billion or even $4 billion. 
Moreover, such an award, based only on ex ante information, would not 
reflect the risk actually borne by the infringer. If the parties had 
negotiated at that time, the licensee might have agreed both to carry out 
the clinical trials at its expense and to provide a lump-sum payment, both 
of which reduce the risk to the patentee, and it may be that in fact the only 
service actually provided was carrying out clinical trials. Or the patentee 
might have borne some risk in establishing one indication for a drug, 
while the infringer bore a similar risk in developing a different indication.  
The better approach is to consider ex post information both for the 
purpose of establishing the true value of the invention and to account for 
the infringer’s actual―not hypothetical―risk-bearing role. So, in our 
Integra hypothetical, suppose that at the time of trial it was known that 
the drug was not toxic, and it was effective for treating disease A but not 
disease B. The parties would base the royalty on a split of the known 
market value of $2 billion, so that the patentee would be entitled to a 
reasonable royalty of $1 billion, which would then be adjusted by the 
infringer’s actual risk-bearing role, as revealed by ex post information. If 
the infringer had in fact borne all the risk of taking the product to market, 
and the parties would have assessed the value of risk bearing at 10%, then 
the reasonable royalty should be reduced to $900 million to reflect the 
fact that the infringer bore the risk of bringing the product to market. 
Conversely, if the infringer had not in fact borne any risk, then the 
patentee should be entitled to the full $1 billion. The approach accurately 
preserves the patent incentive while also recognizing the risk actually—
not hypothetically—borne by the infringer. 
There is a more general point here. Risk bearing is a service that the 
licensee may provide, just as it may provide other services such as 
marketing or carrying out clinical trials. The licensee’s share of the 
surplus reflects the various services provided by the licensee. In our 
example based on Integra, the licensee presumably had the specialized 
expertise that would have enabled it to take the patented drug through 
clinical trials. The licensee’s share of the royalty reflects this service, 
along with other services such as marketing and distribution. The exact 
nature of the services provided will depend on the terms of the contract. 
The user should only be rewarded for providing such services if it in fact 
provided them. If the user did the work necessary to make the drug a 
commercial success, including taking it through clinical trials, marketing, 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See supra Section II.B. 
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and distribution, then it should be compensated for having done so, but 
not otherwise. That a hypothetical licensee would have provided a 
particular service cannot justify compensating an infringer for a service 
that it did not provide.  
The principle behind the use of ex post information is the same 
whether that information relates to sales volume or risk shifting. Higher 
sales than expected should be reflected in a higher royalty; and by the 
same token, if the infringer in fact bore a greater share of the risk, it 
should be compensated for having provided that service. But conversely, 
the infringer should not have to pay an inflated royalty for a product that 
the public did not want simply because the parties were overly optimistic 
about demand; nor should the patentee have to pay the infringer for 
bearing risk if it did not actually do so. The general principle is that the 
damages award should reflect the true value, not just of the invention, but 
also of the contributions made by both parties to the infringing sales.160 
2.  Double Marginalization and Strategic Considerations 
One reason the parties may use a lump-sum royalty is that a running 
royalty effectively increases the licensee’s marginal cost, thereby 
increasing the licensee’s profit maximizing price and reducing the 
quantity sold. 161  Because a lump-sum royalty is a fixed cost, the 
licensee’s marginal cost is lower, and it can expand output, thereby 
generating more revenue for the parties to split. This is sometimes 
referred to as a problem of double marginalization.162 More generally, the 
patentee may use its licensing practices to affect conditions in the 
downstream market, particularly when the licensing regime can affect 
competition among multiple licensees, thereby introducing strategic 
considerations into the licensing calculus. 163  In general terms, the 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See supra Subsection I.C.3. 
 161. See Kenneth Fjell et al., On the Choice of Royalty Rule to Cover Fixed Costs in Input 
Joint Ventures 3 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Info Inst., Working Paper No. 4332, 2013).  
 162. See Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, Fee Versus Royalties and the Private Value of 
a Patent, 101 Q.J. ECON. 471, 472, 484 (1986); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent 
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013–14, 2014 n.48 (2007) (describing the 
relationship between double marginalization and complementary patents). 
 163. See Morton I. Kamien, Patent Licensing, in 1 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH 
ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 331, 346 (Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., 1992). Note that even 
apart from the uncertainty related to future demand, the double marginalization problem will not 
necessarily lead the parties to adopt a flat fee, as the optimal negotiating position for the parties 
will depend on the nature of the market. Running royalties, however, do increase the licensee’s 
marginal costs, and so depending on the nature of the licensing and product markets, can induce 
licensees to restrict their levels of output, thereby decreasing overall industry profits and 
consequently the amount the patentee can extract. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, On the 
Licensing of Innovations, 16 RAND J. ECON. 504, 505 (1985); Carl Shapiro, Patent Licensing and 
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patentee will want to license in such a way as to constrain competition in 
the downstream market to make that market more profitable, but only to 
the extent that it can also extract some of the excess profits. In the 
theoretical literature, the license structure that is optimal for the patentee 
often will be a combination of fixed fee with a per unit or ad valorem 
running royalty, and the optimal strategy may also involve entirely 
different licensing strategies, such as an auction or other more exotic 
mechanisms.164 
Even if the parties to an actual negotiation would have used a lump 
sum to avoid the problem of double marginalization, this would not 
justify an attempt by a court to recreate that lump sum in assessing 
damages because, as with risk shifting, damages awarded ex post cannot 
substitute for a lump sum actually paid ex ante. An actual royalty that a 
licensee factors into its cost calculations will increase the licensee’s 
marginal cost, but a hypothetical royalty will not affect the licensee’s 
actual sales because that unanticipated hypothetical royalty does not 
increase the marginal cost of the goods that have already been sold. 
Again, as with risk shifting, the only way in which a reasonable royalty 
damages award based on a running royalty could influence the past sale 
price is if the infringer fully anticipated it—if ex ante the infringer had 
concluded a court would likely find it liable for infringing a valid patent, 
and the infringer anticipated that a court would award damages on the 
basis of a running royalty, it might have increased its sales price to build 
up a reserve against this anticipated liability. But again, as noted in the 
discussion of risk shifting, if the infringer were so certain of having to 
pay the royalty, it surely would have actually licensed to save the 
litigation costs. The same logic applies to structures adopted for strategic 
reasons more generally; the point of strategic licensing is to affect the 
market structure and the price at which the products are sold. When 
damages are assessed, the products have already been sold, and the 
market structure cannot be changed retroactively. 
                                                                                                                     
R&D Rivalry, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 27 (1985); Rubén Hernández-Murillo & Gerard Llobet, 
Patent Licensing Revisited: Heterogeneous Firms and Product Differentiation 2 (CEMFI, 
Working Paper No. 0301, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=386441.  
 164. See, for example, the discussion of the “chutzpah” mechanism in Kamien, supra note 
163, at 348–52. The particular implications of strategic behavior for optimal licensing by the 
patentee generally depend on the degree and nature of competition in the downstream market 
(e.g., the number of potential licensees). See id. at 348–49; Hernández-Murillo & Llobet, supra 
note 163, at 12. A variant occurs when a practicing entity seeks an elevated royalty when licensing 
to competitors to raise their marginal cost. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing 
the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2134 (2013) (noting that in some instances 
“practicing entities are far more likely to insist on running royalties because they might have a 
strategic interest in raising the marginal cost of their competitors’ products”).  
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3.  Time Value of Money  
Another reason the parties might want to use a lump-sum payment is 
that the patentee gets the use of the money immediately.165 Presumably 
the patentee earns less than if it used a running royalty because the 
licensee has to give up the use of the money immediately; but the implicit 
interest rate in terms of forgone royalties must be less than the patentee 
could obtain from outside sources, or the patentee would prefer to use a 
running royalty with a higher expected value, while borrowing from 
outside sources for its cash needs. Again, even if the parties would have 
agreed to a lump sum for this reason, a court in assessing damages should 
not attempt to replicate that lump sum for the now familiar reason that 
damages ex post are not functionally equivalent to a lump sum actually 
paid ex ante. The point of the lump sum is to give the patentee immediate 
access to funds, and damages by their nature will be awarded long after 
the time at which the lump sum payment would have been made. In 
assessing damages, the time value of money can only be reflected in 
prejudgment interest.166 Since prejudgment interest is normally awarded 
in any event,167 it is not sensible to attempt to recreate the time value of 
money implicit in a lump sum that a patentee would actually have 
received at the time of the first use by using only ex ante information to 
assess that lump sum.  
4.  Monitoring 
Yet another advantage of a fully paid-in lump-sum royalty as opposed 
to a running royalty is that it reduces monitoring costs.168 Monitoring 
typically imposes costs on both parties and thus reduces the net surplus 
to be divided.169 If monitoring costs are high, the parties may use a lump 
sum to avoid them.170 But even if the parties would have chosen a lump 
sum to address monitoring concerns, it does not follow that the courts 
should attempt to replicate that agreement in awarding damages. A court 
does not face the same monitoring problem because the tools available to 
the court, in particular discovery, are very different. The court therefore 
need not award a royalty based on expected value rather than actual use 
in an effort to replicate the agreement the parties would have entered into, 
when the rationale for using a lump sum is inapplicable. 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(comparing a lump-sum analysis to a running royalty analysis and finding that a lump-sum license 
allows the patentee to raise cash quickly).  
 166. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655–56 (1983).  
 167. See id. at 656–57 (holding that courts normally should award the prevailing patent 
owner prejudgment interest). 
 168. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326. 
 169. See id.  
 170. See id.  
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With that said, while the courts will not face the same monitoring costs 
that the parties would have faced, the evidentiary costs facing the litigants 
in assessing actual use may also be substantial. Indeed, in some situations 
the cost of gathering relevant ex post information may be prohibitive, in 
which case assessing damages based on expected value will be justified. 
This is discussed in more detail below.171 
5.  Summary 
In this Section we have argued that a court should not attempt to 
replicate a lump sum that similarly situated parties would have agreed to 
in a hypothetical negotiation because an award of damages ex post cannot 
functionally replicate an actual lump sum received ex ante. A fortiori, it 
would be wrong to distort the patent incentive by using only ex ante 
information in a futile attempt to replicate the effect of a lump-sum 
royalty. This brings us back to the problem of the tail wagging the dog. 
Suppose, for example, that similarly situated parties expected sales of 
1000 units and that they would have negotiated a lump-sum royalty based 
on that projection to give the patentee immediate access to funds. If actual 
sales were 10,000 units, it would be absurd to distort the patent incentive 
by basing the royalty calculation on sales of 1000 units on the ground that 
doing so is necessary to capture the time value of the money the patentee 
would have earned from a lump-sum payment received at the time of the 
hypothetical negotiation, when the patentee never in fact received such a 
payment, and the time value of money is already reflected in the 
prejudgment interest rate. The same point can be made with respect to 
risk shifting, strategic licensing, and monitoring. This is not to say that 
such considerations should be ignored. Rather, they should be taken into 
account using ex post information. Actual sales volume should be used 
to determine the value of the invention, and then to the extent that the 
infringer actually bore risk or provided early funds or any other service, 
the royalty based on actual sales should be adjusted to account for 
services actually provided.  
Different issues arise when the court is awarding a royalty going 
forward in lieu of an injunction. If monitoring is inefficient for the parties 
in a real world license, it may well also be inefficient for the court to 
award a running royalty going forward.172 In that case, the court may wish 
to award a lump-sum royalty to cover the use going forward. But that 
lump sum should still be assessed on the basis of all the information 
                                                                                                                     
 171. See infra Section II.H. 
 172. In principle, a similar argument may be made with respect to the other factors we have 
considered. So, a lump-sum royalty to cover use of the patented invention going forward might 
take into account concerns over double marginalization. However, such concerns are likely too 
fine-grained to be taken into account in practice, given that the damages assessment is inevitably 
no more than a rough estimate of the true loss. 
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available at the time of litigation. That is, if the parties’ expected sales 
are 1000 units per year indefinitely, and in fact sales for five years 
between the first infringement and trial are 10,000 per year, and the 
evidence indicates that demand is likely to be stable, the court should 
award a royalty going forward based on 10,000 units per year, not 1000. 
We have discussed lump-sum royalties at some length because 
situations in which the parties would have agreed to a lump sum raise the 
contrast between the pure and contingent ex ante approaches most 
sharply. Of course, parties do not always use a lump sum, despite all of 
the advantages outlined above. Although we are not aware of any current 
statistics on point, the conventional wisdom is that running royalties 
(sometimes combined with an initial lump-sum payment) are much more 
common in practice than purely lump-sum licenses.173 The reason for 
this, we suggest, is simple: the parties normally prefer that the royalty 
reflect the true value of the invention rather than expectations―which are 
likely to prove erroneous―and there must be some substantial 
countervailing reason to use a lump sum before the parties will do so. In 
effect, a running royalty is a way that the parties can use ex post 
information in a negotiation that takes place ex ante. The contingent ex 
ante approach adopts the same basic principle while recognizing that the 
reasons that the parties might use a lump sum in actual negotiations are 
not normally applicable in the damages context.  
F.  Bargaining Weakness  
In some cases, the relative bargaining power of the parties may change 
over time. Suppose the patentee was in a weak position at the time of the 
first infringement, and so would have accepted a 20/80 split of the 
expected profits, but it would be in a position to demand a 50% share if 
the negotiation took place at the time of trial. Should information about 
the patentee’s improved bargaining power be used to determine the 
royalty split?174 
                                                                                                                     
 173. See, e.g., 3 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 18.06 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2015) (“Without doubt, the most common form of consideration for 
licenses of patents, know-how, trade secrets and trademarks is what is known as running 
royalty.”).  But see FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY 1, 85–86 (2016) 
(reporting that among the patent assertion entities (PAEs), defined as “businesses that acquire 
patents from third parties and seek to generate revenue by asserting them against alleged 
infringers,” that the FTC recently studied, “[t]he reported licenses were predominantly lump 
sum;” in part because litigation PAEs (sometimes referred to as patent trolls) prefer not to monitor 
or enforce licenses).   
 174. Note that bargaining weakness is not generally a live issue. The split either turns on 
some rule of thumb—25%, or the Nash 50%, though U.S. law now disfavors both—or on the split 
in comparable licenses. This kind of adjustment is just too fine-grained for most actual royalty 
assessments. 
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In our view, a generic appeal to bargaining weakness cannot answer 
this question. To determine whether and how a royalty payment should 
be adjusted to account for changes in bargaining power, it is necessary to 
identify the particular source of the change in bargaining power.175 This 
will normally be straightforward because a party relying on changed 
circumstances to argue for a different split (or that certain licenses should 
not be taken as comparable), must be able to specify the particular 
change. Once the source of the change in bargaining power is identified, 
it should be dealt with on its own terms, rather than on the basis of the 
generic bargaining power label.  
To illustrate, suppose that the patentee was originally in a weak 
bargaining position because it was in difficult financial circumstances. A 
low lump-sum royalty that a licensee could have extracted is equivalent 
to the licensee providing a loan to a risky borrower in exchange for the 
expectation of a continuous income stream (here, from using the 
patent).176 The infringer should not be rewarded with a similarly low 
reasonable royalty because it would have provided a loan at the time of 
the first infringement if it did not actually do so. 
As another example, perhaps the patentee was in a weak bargaining 
position because the infringer had a specialized distribution system 
necessary for product success. 177  If the infringer in fact used that 
distribution system to open up the market, and the patentee’s bargaining 
position subsequently improved because the market had been developed 
as a result of the infringer’s efforts, then the infringer should be rewarded 
for having actually provided the service of opening the market, even 
though it did so as an infringer. On the other hand, if the product 
succeeded because the plaintiff incurred substantial costs in developing 
its own alternative distribution system, then the infringer should not be 
                                                                                                                     
 175. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract 
Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1674–77 (2012) (providing a general discussion of the meaning of 
the term “bargaining power”); Sebastian Zimmeck, A Game-Theoretic Model for Reasonable 
Royalty Calculation, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 357, 375–406 (2012) (considering how the 
Georgia-Pacific factors relate to bargaining power). Since the court rejected the 25% rule of 
thumb as a basis for assessing a reasonable royalty in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 
F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011), some expert witnesses have invoked a Nash Bargaining 
Solution, which assumes equal bargaining power, so that the parties would split the available 
surplus 50/50. See, e.g., Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). The Federal Circuit rejected this approach, however, in Virnetx, id. at 1331–34, as 
insufficiently tied to the facts. This is consistent with our view that “bargaining power” needs to 
be unpacked before one can usefully apply it in assessing a reasonable royalty.  
 176. Cf. Virnetx, 767 F.3d at 1330 (noting that royalty analysis involves uncertainty).  
 177. See, for example, TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 
1986), in which the defendant argued that the patentee “had an unproven product he was desperate 
to license to a company like Dura with marketing and manufacturing expertise.” On these facts, 
this appears to have been simply a baseless assertion, and nothing in the decision turned on it. 
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rewarded simply because it would have provided the distribution system 
if they had negotiated at the time of the first infringement even though it 
did not actually do so.178 
In all of these cases, it is necessary to use ex post information to 
determine the service actually provided by the infringer. This avoids 
giving the infringer a windfall by rewarding it for a service that it did not 
actually provide. 
G.  Noninfringing Alternatives 
As noted above, one factor that is always relevant in negotiating patent 
royalties, real or hypothetical, is the potential licensee’s ability to avoid 
using the patented invention at all by opting for a noninfringing 
alternative. 179  If, for example, the parties expect that the potential 
licensee would earn $100 in profits by using the patented invention and 
$80 from the next-best alternative, the patented invention is worth only 
$20 to the licensee. On these facts, the licensee’s maximum willingness 
to pay for a license would be less than or equal to $20 plus the cost of 
acquiring the next-best alternative.180 More generally, the value of the 
patented invention to the licensee is capped at the benefit the licensee 
derives from the patent over and above the benefit it would derive from 
using the next-best noninfringing alternative. By this same logic, if there 
are no feasible noninfringing alternatives, the patent owner can extract 
the entire value of the use (in the above example, $100). But what if a 
proposed alternative’s status as infringing or noninfringing is determined 
only after the date on which the hypothetical negotiations occur? 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 32, at 790, (arguing that “[a] patent holder does not 
become more injured by unauthorized use if it enjoys a stronger bargaining position, and it does 
not become less injured by such unauthorized use if it enjoys a weaker bargaining position”). If 
the concept of bargaining weakness is unpacked, we disagree. A patent holder who can extract a 
higher share of the incremental profit because it has a good alternative distribution system is more 
injured by infringement than a patentee was not in a position to distribute its own product.  
 179. See supra Section I.A.  
 180. If the next-best alternative technology is in the public domain, the cost of acquiring it 
is zero. If the alternative itself is patented, the cost of acquiring it is the cost of obtaining a 
license. If the two patentees engage in Bertrand competition, this too would be zero, while under 
other (possibly more common) scenarios it might be positive. Judge Holderman discusses these 
issues to some extent in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2303, No. 11 
C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (concluding that the court would 
consider patented alternatives but “that they will not drive down the royalty in the hypothetical 
negotiation by as much as technology in the public domain”).  
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A recent case on point is AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp. 181  
AstraZeneca (Astra) owned a patent on the compound omeprazole, which 
it marketed as a gastrointestinal drug under the brand name Prilosec; this 
patent expired in 2001.182 Astra also owned two patents pertaining to a 
specific formulation of omeprazole; these patents expired in 2007.183 
Between 2001 and 2007, therefore, generic drug companies could market 
omeprazole only if they avoided using Astra’s patented formulation.184 
The first such company to do so, KUDCo, began marketing a 
noninfringing omeprazole product in 2002 using its own patented 
formulation.185 The following year, three other companies (Mylan, Lek, 
and Apotex) produced generic omeprazole “at risk,” that is, before any 
court had determined whether their formulations infringed.186 In 2007, a 
court ruled that Mylan’s and Lek’s formulations did not infringe but that 
Apotex’s formulation did. 187 The question before the court in 2013, 
therefore, was the amount of damages that Apotex owed Astra, based on 
a hypothetical negotiation just prior to the date on which Apotex began 
infringing in November 2003.188 
Apotex argued that but for the infringement, it could have launched a 
competing product by copying the noninfringing formulations employed 
by Mylan and Lek.189 The court rejected this argument on the basis that 
the ex post information available at the time of the hypothetical 
negotiation is limited to knowledge that the patent at issue is valid and 
infringed, and does not extend to knowledge of whether alternatives are 
infringing: “The hypothetical negotiation framework does not treat the 
parties as having knowledge of all events between the negotiation and the 
finding of infringement simply because it requires them to assume that 
the Patents are valid and infringed.”190 
                                                                                                                     
 181. 985 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in relevant part, 782 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). A variation on this theme arose in Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *20 (rejecting the 
argument that the court should consider, as a possible noninfringing alternative, a patent that 
existed but that the IEEE did not consider at the time of standard adoption). For reasons discussed 
in the text above, we believe the court should have taken the patent into account.  
 182. AstraZeneca, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id.  
 185. Id. at 463.  
 186. Id. at 463–64. 
 187. See id. at 464 n.7. 
 188. Id. at 459.  
 189. Id. at 481.  
 190. See id. at 481, 500 n.36. The facts of the case were more complex and did not present 
this issue so clearly. The court concluded that, as of November 2003, Apotex lacked the ability to 
employ the noninfringing alternative formulations used by Mylan and Lek. See id. at 481. This 
would have justified the court’s conclusion even on the contingent ex ante approach, albeit for 
different reasons. Moreover, like KUDCo, Mylan and Lek also owned patents relating to their 
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Our view is that, on the contrary, courts should assume that parties 
bargain ex ante with knowledge of all relevant information that is 
revealed ex post, including the existence of noninfringing alternatives, 
even though in reality this information remained uncertain until 2007.191 
As noted above, the value of an invention to a licensee is its marginal 
value compared to the noninfringing alternative.192 If the patent can in 
fact be invented around relatively easily, then it is not a valuable 
contribution to the art, even though it may be difficult to know in advance 
which of the various easily developed alternatives actually infringe. Put 
another way, patents are intended to reward valuable technical 
innovations, not to reward the uncertainty inherent in the patent system; 
excluding ex post information from the hypothetical negotiating parties’ 
information set effectively enables the patent owner to extract rents based 
precisely on such uncertainty.193  
Similarly, suppose that the ex post information at issue was that 
KUDCo’s patent was invalid, and the noninfringing product sold by 
KUDCo would have been the best noninfringing alternative at the 
unpatented price. On our analysis, Apotex’s damages should be 
calculated on the basis that the parties would have known that KUDCo’s 
patent was invalid at the time of the hypothetical negotiation. If the 
examination of KUDCo’s patent had been more rigorous, the patent 
would not have issued in the first place, and Apotex’s damages should 
not turn on the vagaries of the examination process. Whether KUDCo’s 
patent examiner was more or less experienced, or was trying to close the 
file to get away early on a Friday afternoon, should have no bearing on 
Apotex’s liability. Thus, as in our other examples, the use of ex post 
information better correlates the patent owner’s private reward with the 
invention’s social value. Moreover, in such situations, the use of actual 
facts, as opposed to recreating the hypothetical licensee’s expectations, 
should be administratively much simpler.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
formulations. See id. at 481, 500 n.36. How to proceed when the alternative itself is patented is a 
separate question. See supra note 181. 
 191. See id. at 459.  
 192. See supra text accompanying note 51. 
 193. Note also that if potential infringers are systematically irrationally pessimistic about 
whether an alternative product infringes, use of the pure ex ante approach inflates the return to 
weak patents. Conversely, the incentive to create would be undermined if it turns out that 
infringers are systematically overoptimistic on this issue. In any event, the reward for invention 
should not turn on the quirks of behavioral psychology any more than on the uncertainty inherent 
in the legal system. 
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H.  Administrability and Evidentiary Considerations 
We have argued that courts generally should use ex post information 
to determine the reasonable royalty, because doing so enables a more 
accurate determination of the value of the invention. But the overarching 
principle is that the royalty should be commensurate with the true value 
of the invention. Normally this requires using ex post information, but 
sometimes using ex ante information may provide a better assessment of 
the true value of the invention. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc. 
illustrates this point,194 as the court (correctly) assessed royalties based 
only on ex ante information.  
The court in Hanson made two main points in coming to its 
conclusion. We will call these the insurance argument and the evidentiary 
argument.195 While the insurance argument is intuitively very appealing, 
ultimately it is wrong, but the evidentiary argument alone provides a 
complete justification for the holding. 
Hanson held a patent for a snow-making machine for use at ski 
hills.196 The patented invention was a radically new technology that was 
much more efficient than the prior art.197 The royalty assessed by the 
magistrate and affirmed by the Federal Circuit was one-third of the 
expected cost saving of using the invention as compared with the older 
technology.198 In practice, this meant that the royalty was a fixed rate 
based on the capacity of the snow-making machine, regardless of the 
amount the machine was actually used. The infringer, Alpine, argued that 
the royalty should have been based on its actual use, which Alpine 
asserted was much lower than the average or expected use.199 
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s arguments, for two 
reasons. The first is what we will refer to as the insurance argument: 
[A] royalty based upon actual use would have been 
inconsistent with the function snowmaking equipment 
serves at a ski resort and the reasonable needs and 
expectations of both the licensor and the licensee. A resort 
has snowmaking machinery to enable it to function at times 
when there is no or insufficient natural snow. As the 
magistrate stated, the resort hopes that “natural snow will 
always be sufficient and that artificial snow will never be 
needed.” He noted that the “machines insure the business can 
function without natural snow” and that Hanson’s “expert 
                                                                                                                     
 194. 718 F.2d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 195. See id. at 1080. 
 196. Id. at 1076. 
 197. See id. at 1076. 
 198. Id. at 1077, 1083.  
 199. See id. at 1080. 
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likened the machine to an insurance policy.” The magistrate 
justifiably concluded that in these circumstances “[t]he 
number of hours a machine is used is irrelevant; the desire is 
never to use the machine. The machine’s utility simply does 
not depend upon its hours of operation.”200 
While there is some merit to this point, it is an overstatement to say 
that the actual use of the machine is “irrelevant” to the value of the 
invention. A ski-hill operator might count on opening earlier or extending 
the season beyond what normally would be permitted by using the 
machine. To this extent, the value of the machine resides not in its 
insurance function but rather in its use. Moreover, even if we ignore this 
aspect of the machine’s value, there is still another substantial use value. 
Suppose that the operator does not intend to use the machine in this way 
but solely for insurance (for example to make snow after an unexpected 
mid-winter thaw). Use is still relevant to the insurance value of the 
machine because the invention will be worth more to an operator who 
encounters more such incidents. The invention will be much more 
valuable in a region with highly variable weather where several mid-
winter thaws normally occur, than it will be in an area in which the 
weather is highly predictable. In the extreme, in an area in which mid-
winter thaws never occur, no ski hill would bother buying the machine 
for insurance purposes. This means that snow-making for insurance 
purposes really has two components: it reduces the actual loss caused by 
variable weather, and it also reduces the loss caused by the uncertainty 
and attendant inability to plan. The first component depends on use, while 
the second is the pure insurance component.201 So it is wrong to say that 
the machine’s utility does not depend on its hours of operation.  
Accordingly, one can assess the insurance component of the royalty 
in Hanson, as discussed above under “Risk Shifting” above, though there 
is a twist to that analysis.202 The court in Hanson explicitly addressed the 
risk-shifting argument, stating that both parties would prefer a lump sum 
because it reduced risk on both sides: 
A royalty based on actual use would produce 
unsatisfactory results here for both the licensor and the 
licensee. If there were extensive snow during the season, 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Id.  
 201. Put another way, to the extent that the snow-making machine reduces the loss from a 
mid-winter thaw, its value lies in the amount by which it reduces the loss, which is to say its use. 
The fact that a reduction in loss reduces uncertainty is a separate benefit. This is true for any 
device that serves an accident prevention or insurance function; it will always be more valuable 
to a user who has more accidents. The only product that serves a pure insurance function is 
monetary insurance itself. 
 202. See supra Subsection II.E.1. 
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there would be little use of the machine and the patentee 
would receive an inadequate return for the value of his 
invention. On the other hand, if there were little or no snow, 
the licensee would have to pay exceptionally large 
royalties.203  
A first point to note is that a lump sum is normally said to shift risk 
from the patentee to the user, rather than reducing the risk to both. 
However, with some caveats, the court’s analysis in Hanson is correct in 
suggesting that in this case a lump sum would reduce risk to both 
parties.204 The court is wrong to say that the patentee would receive an 
inadequate return under a running royalty because higher royalties in 
years of little snow would offset lower royalties in years of extensive 
snow.205 Nevertheless, a lump sum does reduce risk to the patentee, as 
compared with a running royalty, and the patentee might have preferred 
a lump sum for that reason. What is unusual about Hanson is that a lump 
sum also reduces the risk to the user. Normally, a lump sum increases risk 
to a user faced with an uncertain demand for the patented product because 
under a running royalty, the amount owed by the user is higher when 
demand (and hence profits) are high, and lower when demand (and hence 
profits) are low.206 But in Hanson, the correlation runs the other way. 
When there is no snow and profits would otherwise be low, payments 
under a running royalty will be high; when there is plenty of snow and 
higher profits, payments will be low.207  
This unusual relationship between risk and the nature of the royalty 
does not change our basic analysis discussed above.208 First, even if the 
patentee would have preferred a lump sum because it would have reduced 
the patentee’s risk, infringement by the user does not reduce the 
patentee’s risk in the same way. A hypothetical negotiation based only 
on ex ante information would reward the infringer as if it had borne some 
of the risk, even though it did not. The fact that the infringer would also 
have preferred a lump sum from a risk perspective does not change this. 
Second, the point remains that using a hypothetical negotiation based 
only on ex ante information to replicate risk shifting would be the tail 
wagging the dog. The risk-shifting motivation might have been quite a 
minor consideration in the actual case. A running royalty on the facts of 
                                                                                                                     
 203. See Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1080.  
 204. See id.  
 205. See id.  
 206. Similarly, where the patent’s principal function is to reduce the cost of production, a 
lump sum would increase the user’s risk of cost uncertainty. 
 207. Put another way, if use of the snow machine fully compensates for variable snowfall, 
profits will be constant in all states of the world, but royalty payments will be variable under a 
running royalty, thus increasing the risk to the user as compared with a lump sum. See id. 
 208. See supra Subsection II.E.1.  
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Hanson would have given rise to a serious monitoring problem, as 
discussed below, and absent evidence of substantial risk aversion on the 
part of the parties, we expect that monitoring concerns probably were the 
main factor leading the parties to prefer a lump sum. Moreover, using ex 
ante information also would distort the primary goal of ensuring that the 
patent incentive is preserved. Both of these considerations weigh heavily 
against replicating a hypothetical lump sum based on ex ante information 
merely to preserve the risk-shifting effect. The point here is that 
replicating the risk-shifting arrangement implicit in a lump-sum royalty 
is not a sufficient reason to assess the royalty using only ex ante 
information, even in an unusual case like Hanson where a lump sum 
would reduce risk to both parties. 
With all that said, we are of the view that Hanson was correctly 
decided. To see why, imagine how the ex post allocation of risk shifting 
would actually work on the facts in Hanson. To assess damages using ex 
post information, we would first have to assess the amount that the 
invention was actually used and assess damages for use accordingly. To 
this use value, the court would then need to add a separate component to 
reflect the insurance value. In principle this can also be assessed on an ex 
post basis; the insurance function is more valuable the more the weather 
fluctuates from seasonal averages at a particular ski hill. Again, to the 
extent that the parties’ ex ante expectations are accurate, the insurance 
value assessed ex post will be the same as the expected insurance value 
ex ante. 
This approach to assessing damages will no doubt strike the reader as 
being very impractical, and we agree. In order to determine the 
appropriate use and risk rates, it would be necessary to deconstruct those 
rates by looking at the use and risk associated with typical customers, 
separate out (somehow) the use and risk components, then determine the 
use and risk faced by the particular infringer and apply the deconstructed 
rates to the actual usage. This would be impossibly complex, not least 
because actual customers did not actually negotiate separate use and risk 
rates. Consequently, this approach should not be used—but because it is 
impractical, not because it is wrong in principle.  
This leads to a second key point. The evidence was that Hanson would 
only have granted licenses at a uniform rate and that it did not grant—and 
would not have granted—licenses based on use.209 Why not? One major 
reason for this, as the court explained, is that “it would have been 
extremely difficult to monitor actual use. Apparently no complete or 
accurate records were kept of the actual use of the Hedco machines at 
Alpine’s resort.”210 
                                                                                                                     
 209. Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1077.  
 210. Id. at 1080. 
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There are two important points here. The first is that the patentee did 
not license on a use basis because of the difficulty of monitoring use.211 
The second is that it would be very difficult for the court to assess 
damages based on actual use because the evidence of actual use is very 
unreliable. 212 The patentee itself could not monitor that use, and the 
infringer had no incentive to do so either, and did not. 
In our view, this provides a simple and compelling justification for the 
result in Hanson. Recall that the basic argument in favor of using ex post 
information is that it provides a simpler and more accurate assessment of 
the true value of the invention than does the parties’ ex ante expectations. 
While we have argued that this is often true, ultimately that argument 
turns on practical evidentiary considerations. We acknowledge that if the 
parties’ ex ante expectations are correct on average, then there will be no 
difference between the two approaches from an incentive perspective. 
Our argument therefore reduces to the proposition that ex post 
information is more likely to be accurate than ex ante expectations. But 
even if this is true about information in the abstract, there is no such thing 
as information in the abstract. In any particular case the argument will 
turn on the relative reliability of specific evidence actually available. In a 
case such as Hanson, it is almost certainly true that the ex ante 
expectations of the parties are better evidence of the actual value of the 
invention than an attempt to ascertain what the ex post value would be.213  
As we have emphasized, the fundamental principle is that the damages 
award should be commensurate with the true value of the invention. We 
have argued that in many contexts, taking into account ex post 
information allows for a more accurate assessment of the true value of 
the invention. But Hanson provides an example in which it is almost 
certainly cheaper and more accurate to assess damages solely on the basis 
of expected value, rather than to make a determination on the basis of ex 
post evidence, which is, in the particular context, very unreliable.  
 
*    *    * 
 
By means of the examples discussed in this Part, we have shown that 
the contingent ex ante approach provides a better framework for 
accurately determining the (non-holdup) value of patents in a variety of 
                                                                                                                     
 211. See id.  
 212. See id.  
 213. One might speculate that, given the various proposed strategic advantages of using some 
form of running royalty as discussed in Section II.E, parties are most likely to agree to lump-sum 
royalties in contexts similar to Hanson where it would be disproportionately costly to monitor the 
amount of the licensee’s use. Agreements of this type may be fairly common in reality, even if 
cases such as Hanson in which monitoring costs are high both ex ante and ex post typically 
generate insufficient stakes to appear frequently among the reported decisions. 
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settings, by enabling courts to take into account value-relevant ex post 
developments, such as the inclusion of the patent in a chosen standard, an 
increase or decrease in demand for goods incorporating the patent, 
regulatory approval (or not) of the patented product for marketing, and 
the demonstrable availability of noninfringing alternatives. The approach 
also allows courts to avoid formalistic inquiries into whether an infringer 
has committed one act or multiple acts of infringement, and it ensures 
that the damages judgment properly reflects both services rendered and 
burdens avoided by the infringer. At the same time, the approach is 
flexible enough to accommodate the use of ex ante information in the 
(probably atypical) case in which the cost of acquiring ex post 
information would be prohibitive. The contingent ex ante approach 
therefore provides not only a principled explanation for certain otherwise 
anomalous aspects of current law, as described in Part I, but also an 
economically sound basis for resolving a host of difficult questions 
surrounding the measurement of damages in specific cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators often seem to assume that there are only two 
theoretical options for calculating a reasonable royalty: what we have 
referred to above as the “pure” ex ante and ex post approaches. Under the 
pure ex ante approach, the court attempts to construct the bargain the 
parties would have negotiated prior to infringement—ex ante—on the 
basis of information that was available to them at that time.214 On this 
view, ex post information is relevant only to the extent it provides 
circumstantial evidence of what the parties’ ex ante expectations might 
have been. So stated, the pure ex ante approach avoids holdup—basing 
the royalty in part on the defendant’s sunk costs, which do not reflect the 
value of the invention—but nevertheless must provide for ad hoc 
exceptions to account for the assumption of validity and infringement and 
for the use of a royalty base comprising actual, ex post sales. By contrast, 
under the pure ex post approach, a court would attempt to replicate the 
bargain the parties might have reached at some point after the defendant 
began infringing, possibly as late as the date on which judgment is 
entered. Because it uses more accurate information about the actual value 
of the invention, the pure ex post approach may seem to better align the 
patentee’s reward with the social value of the invention; but unless an ad 
hoc exception is made to this approach, the holdup problem looms large, 
particularly (though certainly not exclusively) in cases involving SEPs. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 214. The lesser-used “analytical” approach, see supra note 8, does not necessarily involve 
the construction of a hypothetical bargain, but like the pure ex ante approach, it uses ex ante 
information—the defendant’s projected profits from the use of the invention.  
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This Article demonstrates that decoupling the timing of the 
hypothetical negotiation from the information set available to the 
hypothetical negotiators enables courts to enjoy the best of both worlds 
by positing a hypothetical ex ante bargain that occurs with full knowledge 
of all relevant information that is available ex post. The ex ante timing 
ensures that sunk costs are excluded from consideration because these 
costs would not factor in to an ex ante bargain. Even if the parties could 
foresee the subsequent magnitude of these costs if they were to arise, they 
would bargain with knowledge that these costs never will arise because 
ex ante the parties either will negotiate to a license or the defendant will 
choose an alternative technology. At the same time, it allows the 
negotiation to occur in light of the best available information as to the 
actual value of the invention as disclosed by subsequent events. And 
while this might seem to be a highly unrealistic framework—absent time 
travel or precognition, no one really can bargain ex ante using ex post 
information—it is less artificial than a pure ex ante approach that is, after 
all, based on a hypothetical negotiation. The hypothetical aspect of both 
the pure and the contingent ex ante approaches is a necessary feature if 
we are to avoid holdup; unlike the pure ex ante approach, however, the 
contingent approach does not compound the hypothetical nature of the 
inquiry by ignoring real-world information that emerges ex post. Using 
this information should lead to a more accurate estimate of patent value 
and thus better align the patentee’s reward with the purposes of the patent 
system.  
Finally, we have analyzed how the contingent ex ante approach should 
apply in a variety of settings—including cases involving SEPs (whether 
FRAND-committed or not), sequential infringement, regulatory 
uncertainty, and unexpected exogenous events—while recognizing that 
there may remain certain discrete cases in which reliance upon ex ante 
information may be necessary because the cost of acquiring ex post 
information is prohibitive. As a general matter, however, our proposed 
framework promises greater accuracy at lower cost than do either of the 
two pure approaches, while at the same time providing a principled and 
unifying explanation for a variety of features of patent remedies. 
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